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SUMMARY
Biofuels, including ethanol and biodiesel, are important components of energy
policy in the U.S. and abroad. There is a long history of ethanol production from
corn (maize) in the United States and from sugarcane in Brazil. However, there
has been a push for greater use of next-generation biofuels (including those derived
from cellulosic feedstocks) to mitigate many of the environmental and potential food
system impacts of large scale biofuel production.
Farmer willingness to grow biomass crops and ensuring adequate feedstock sup-
ply are two important challenges impeding large scale commercialization of next-
generation biofuels. The costs of transporting bulky, low density biomass will be
substantial. Consequently, in the near term, the economic success of next-generation
biofuels will hinge on the supply of locally available biomass. As such, agricultural
contracts are expected to be an important tool in overcoming the feedstock acquisition
challenge. The broad objective of this study is to understand the effect of contracting
for non-food energy crops (cellulosic feedstocks) on the agricultural landscape via the
displacement of commodity (food) crops on productive cropland.
We develop an analytical framework for evaluating the design and use of two dif-
ferent contract structures for securing cellulosic feedstock in a representative supply
chain with a biorefinery and farmer. We study the dynamics of scarce land and in-
direct competition from commodity market production on a biorefinery’s equilibrium
pricing strategy and the resultant supply of cellulosic biomass. And we consider its
sensitivity to various production characteristics and market conditions.
We develop a method for quantifying the biorefinery’s tradeoff between profit
margins and competing for land in order to secure the requisite feedstock for biofuel
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production. And we characterize the loss of efficiency in the decentralized system, rel-
ative to a vertically integrated system, that can be attributed to the need to compete
for the farmer’s scarce land resource versus that which results from the biorefinery’s
desire to make a profit.
Then we extend our framework to consider multi-year contracts for biomass pro-
duction and evaluate the importance of land quality, yield variability and contract
structure on a farmer’s willingness to accept a contract to produce cellulosic feedstock
as well as the resulting impact on the agricultural landscape through the displace-
ment of commodity crops. Using switchgrass production in Tennessee as a case study,
we develop feedstock supply curves for each contract structure considered and eval-
uate the conditions and contract prices at which land devoted to various field crops
would be displaced by switchgrass based on field trials of switchgrass production in




1.1 Background & Motivation
Biofuels (ethanol and biodiesel) are an important component of U.S. energy policy.
Recognizing the need to reduce dependence on foreign oil and mitigate climate change,
regulatory support for biofuels was enacted in 2005 with passage of the Energy Policy
Act—which established the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS)—and was significantly
expanded in 2007 with the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA). There
is a long history of ethanol production from corn (maize) in the United States. The
decade up to 2009 saw considerable growth in production, increasing from 1.46 billion
gallons in 1999 to 10.76 billion gallons in 2009 [34].
There has been much debate, however, regarding the efficacy of first-generation
biofuels (such as ethanol from corn) in meeting energy and environmental goals.
For discussion on fossil energy consumption in the ethanol production process see
[101, 90, 122, 70]; environmental impacts, see [99, 44, 45]; and, impact on food prices
[81, 53, 118, 98, 5]. Next-generation biofuels have the potential to mitigate many of
these concerns [105]. Indeed, the RFS, which mandates 36 billion gallons of renewable
fuel use by 2022, caps the amount that can be met by traditional (corn) ethanol at
15 billion gallons and calls on advanced biofuels, including next-generation biofuels,
to constitute the difference.
To date, production of next-generation biofuels, particularly cellulosic ethanol,
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has fallen woefully short of expectations.1 There are several key challenges prevent-
ing large scale commercialization of cellulosic biofuels. These include: high production
costs and capital outlays; accessing financing alternatives in the pre-commercial de-
velopment phase; farmer willingness to grow new energy crops; ensuring adequate
feedstock supply; and, the blend wall constraint which limits the share of ethanol
blended in gasoline to 10% [26, 100]. In this thesis, we focus our attention on the
challenges of gaining farmer participation and ensuring an adequate supply of biomass
feedstock.
A number of biomass feedstocks can be used to produce cellulosic biofuel, includ-
ing: agricultural crops, crop residues, wood and wood waste, algae, and municipal
solid waste. However, of the companies on public record as having plans to produce
next-generation ethanol, approximately 50% will rely exclusively on agricultural feed-
stocks, including dedicated energy crops like switchgrass [26]. These feedstocks are
bulky with low density; consequently, transportation costs are substantial [95]. And,
unlike ethanol produced from corn, a well-developed infrastructure system for their
production, harvest, storage, and purchase does not yet exist [35]. As such, securing a
reliable supply of feedstock will hinge on the availability of biomass in close proximity
to biofuel facilities [82].
There has been substantial work done in the area of estimating potential feedstock
supplies. Much of this work has derived supply curves based on estimates of the cost
of production [89]. While production costs are an important factor affecting poten-
tial supply, recent surveys of farmer willingness to supply switchgrass have identified
various risk factors as impediments to large–scale production. These impediments
include “the increased complexity associated with alternative farming; the need for
1In 2010, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) announced that it would reduce that
year’s mandated production from 100 million gallons to a mere 6.5 million.
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additional training, information and capital outlays; ... and concerns about the ab-
sence of secure, reliable markets” among others [60]. The importance of anticipated
returns to alternative uses as a key factor in agricultural land use decisions has been
cited in [73].
The importance of locally available feedstock and the factors affecting an agricul-
tural producer’s willingness to produce the necessary feedstock suggest that contract-
ing can play a significant role in mitigating these particular challenges to cellulosic
biofuel expansion. It is from this perspective that we propose a supply chain man-
agement approach to estimating potential feedstock supply and assessing the impact
of contracting for bioenergy crops on the agricultural landscape via the displacement
of commodity crops.
This thesis is composed of three main chapters. Chapter 2 builds the supply chain
framework employed in our analysis of feedstock supply. We assume a two-echelon
decentralized supply chain in which a biorefinery offers a representative agricultural
producer (farmer) a contract to produce an energy crop required for biofuel produc-
tion. We consider the optimal terms of trade under two different contract structures,
evaluate the conditions under which the farmer is willing to accept the terms of trade,
and, upon acceptance, how the farmer decides to allocate her fixed capacity (land) re-
source between energy crop production and production of an alternative (commodity)
good. Using an integrated supply chain as a benchmark, we evaluate the tradeoffs
faced by the biorefinery in determining terms of trade, and its impact on supply. We
also consider the impact of various market and production conditions on equilibrium
outcomes.
Chapter 3 explores the impact of commodity (spot) market production on partic-
ipation (contract acceptance) and capacity allocation in the supply chain framework
from Chapter 2. Our primary analysis assumes a farmer who accepts a contract for
energy crop production will add the energy crop to her existing crop mix at a scale
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proportional to its profitability. However, agricultural surveys show that farmers who
produce under contract do so for a variety of reasons and at a variety of scales. We
compare the contract design problem from the previous chapter with contract design
for a farmer who will “specialize” in production of the contracted good and evaluate
the explicit versus implicit effects of commodity market competition on the supply
chain for biomass feedstock. We also evaluate the merits of breakeven pricing under
both modeling approaches.
Finally, in Chapter 4 we extend the framework developed in Chapter 2 to de-
velop supply curves based on multi-year versions of the two contract structures in
order to assess the impact of contracting for biomass on the agricultural landscape.
Using contracts for switchgrass production in Tennessee as a case study, we also in-
corporate many unresolved issues in biomass production and assess their impact on
the economic feasibility of switchgrass production and the agricultural landscape.
This model is particularly useful in evaluating the importance of yield variability
(both temporal and geographic) and assumptions on the commercial scalability of
switchgrass production as it pertains to the prices at which switchgrass production is
competitive with traditional commodity crops. And, by considering potential supply
at the county level, our model provides more refined estimates which can aid in the






The tools of operations research (OR) have been used extensively to study agricul-
tural production planning, particularly as it relates to land allocation and optimal
crop mixes. Recent work by Kazaz [61] and Kazaz and Webster [62] has considered
planning in the face of yield dependent costs and prices. Ahumada and Villalobos
[4] review the production and distribution planning literature related to agri–food
supply chains. In addition to reviewing the literature in which OR has been used to
study crop production, Lowe and Preckel [72] identify new areas for which OR can aid
agribusiness. Contracting is one area for which research has been deemed necessary.
There is ample literature on contract theory [15, 55, 66, 97]. In the agricultural
context, contracting studies have focused primarily on moral hazard, particularly as
it relates to sharecropping and leasing land from a landlord [3, 39].1 However, despite
its growing use in practice, the literature on contracts for agricultural production is
rather limited. Wilson and Dahl [124] provide a broad survey of the terms and clauses
in grain contracts; Sykuta and Parcell [104] provide a survey of the terms in contracts
for identity-preserved nongenetically modified soybeans. Preckel et al. [91] consider
the link between contract structure and environmental externalities by comparing
the use of nitrogen fertilizer—and consequently nitrate leaching into groundwater—in
response to a secure, fixed-payment structure versus the insecure tournament contract
1There is a long history of agricultural contracting for land, credit and equipment; the use of
contracts for agricultural production (particularly as it relates to crops other than vegetables used
for processing) is a rather recent phenomenon [75].
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structure which is common for livestock and seed corn production. And Carriquiry
and Babcock [23] consider the economic factors which lead farmers and processors to
supply (procure) a particular commodity via contract versus the spot market.
Paulson and Babcock [87] and Larson et al. [68] have studied the role of contract
structure in agricultural supply. Paulson and Babcock model the equilibrium sup-
ply of specialty grains under two production contracts—acreage and bushel. Their
acreage contract is analogous to the wholesale contract we consider here. They as-
sume a participating farmer will allocate all of her land toward production of the
contracted specialty good, while a non-participating farmer uses her entire land re-
source to produce commodities for the spot market. The farmer will participate
provided the processor’s contract premium is sufficient to cover the additional cost of
specialty crop production which is private information held by each farmer.
The Larson et al. study is a bioenergy application in which the expected supply
of feedstocks for ethanol production by a representative agricultural producer is eval-
uated under four contracting alternatives and varying degrees of risk–aversion. The
model we present in this chapter is similar to [68] in that we also consider an agri-
cultural producer’s land allocation decision between energy crops (biofuel feedstocks)
and traditional commodity (food) crops in response to different contract structures.
However, we extend their work to include the optimal decisions of a representative
biorefinery who must determine terms of trade (contract parameters) in order to
secure the desired supply of feedstock. And, since our goal is to understand how
contract structure reduces barriers to the establishment of a market for bioenergy
feedstock, we make a key assumption that no spot market exists for the exchange of
energy crops. In the absence of a spot market, a biorefinery’s supply of feedstock is
limited to what it can induce via contract terms.
Like Paulson and Babcock we are interested in evaluating the conditions under
which an agricultural producer will choose to participate in contracted production
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of a specialty crop. And like Larson et al. we are interested in evaluating the pro-
ducer’s scale of participation, via the land allocated to a specialty crop under various
market and production conditions. However, in addition to modeling an agricultural
producer’s decision to participate in the supply chain for next-generation biofuels by
growing the requisite feedstock, this chapter models the contract design problem in
light of the producer participation problem. Our primary objective is to analyze the
optimal specification of contract terms in order to secure a desired supply of feedstock.
We consider two contract structures: the wholesale (price-only) contract and what
we call a capacity procurement contract. Using a supply chain management frame-
work, we model an agricultural producer’s decision to allocate her fixed land resource
toward production of a risky good (bioenergy feedstock) under contract, and tradi-
tional food/commodity goods for sale on the spot market.2 Taking the producer’s
land allocation response into account, the biorefinery must determine the terms of
trade balancing his own profit goals with the need to compete for the producer’s
resource.
Under wholesale contract, the biorefinery pays for each unit of feedstock (biomass).
This forward cash contract structure, which dictates the terms of exchange, is repre-
sentative of the marketing contracts typically used in contracts for major field crops.
Under capacity procurement contract, however, the biorefinery pays the producer
for each unit of land she allocates toward production of the feedstock. This contract
structure is similar to production contracts which are commonly used in livestock pro-
curement. Production contracts typically pay an agricultural producer for services
rendered in the production of a commodity; the contractor retains ownership of the
commodity while it is under production [76]. We evaluate the role of contract struc-
ture on the producer’s allocation decision, the relationship between contract pricing
2While there is uncertainty associated with all agricultural production due to weather conditions,
pests, etc., we focus on the uncertainty due to complexity and unfamiliarity with alternative farming,
as expressed by the farmers surveyed in [60].
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and market conditions, and overall system performance.3
In the next section we frame our work within the supply chain management liter-
ature. In §2.3 we describe the basic model framework and provide a list of notation.
§2.4 presents the optimal solution for an integrated supply chain which we use as
a benchmark in analyzing the wholesale and capacity procurement contracts. §2.5
compares the performance of each contract structure using a numerical case study.
And §2.6 concludes. Proofs not included in the text can be found in the appendix.
2.2 Literature Review
There is a rich collection of work on contracting, performance and coordination in
the supply chain literature [108, 67, 19]. To position our work we limit this review to
capacity procurement and capacity allocation literature.
In the procurement literature a buyer (manufacturer or retailer) enters into a con-
tractual arrangement with one or more suppliers who will produce components which
the manufacturer will sell to its customers (perhaps after processing or assembling
with other components). Typically, the supplier(s) must build capacity at a constant,
per unit cost well before the buyer learns the actual size of his market (i.e. demand
for the manufacturer’s final product is uncertain at the time the supplier must build
capacity). Once his demand is realized, the manufacturer purchases the requisite com-
ponents in an amount equal to the minimum of demand and the supplier’s installed
capacity.
The risks imposed by high investment costs, long lead times for building capacity
and uncertainty in demand for the manufacturer’s product tend to discourage sup-
pliers from significant expansions in capacity [37]. When demand is high, limited
capacity can lead to significant lost sales for both the supplier and manufacturer,
3Throughout we adopt the convention that “he” refers to the biorefinery while “she” refers to
the agricultural producer/farmer.
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resulting in poor system (supply chain) performance. But when capacity is substan-
tial and demand is low, performance is degraded through the losses associated with
underutilization. Contracting allows the supplier and manufacturer to share these
risks so that supply chain performance can be improved.
Sharing demand forecasts is one method manufacturers use to encourage adequate
capacity. However, since the manufacturer typically only pays for the capacity needed
to satisfy his demand, he has an incentive to inflate his demand forecast in order to
motivate greater capacity investment that would allow him to take advantage of
potential high demand scenarios. Understanding this incentive for the manufacturer
to overestimate his demand, the supplier will use her own, potentially less informed,
assumptions about demand to make the capacity investment decision best for her;
this can lead to substantial inefficiencies within the system. A number of risk sharing
contracts have been put forth in the literature to reconcile this source of inefficiency.
Quantity flexibility contracts share risk and reduce inefficiency through bounds on
the manufacturer’s forecast. The manufacturer submits his forecast to the supplier
and agrees to purchase at least a certain percentage of that forecast while the supplier
agrees to have available capacity at least a certain percentage above the forecast [109].
Quantity commitments, such as minimum purchasing agreements, provide credible
forecasts for the supplier. As such, they allow the manufacturer and supplier to share
the risks arising from uncertain demand better; they ensure a market for the supplier’s
product; and, they ensure a minimum component supply for the manufacturer [8].
See [7, 10, 11] for more on quantity commitments.
Options contracts are similar to minimum purchasing agreements but they offer
the manufacturer a greater degree of flexibility in responding to market conditions
through the exercise of options for additional components after demand has been
realized [8]. Barnes–Schuster et al. [9] study the flexibility of options in a two-
period context where options can be exercised after realization of first period demand
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but before the realization of second period demand. Cachon [19] studies an options
contract with a single demand period; but, unlike [9], the manufacturer does not make
any firm purchase commitments in addition to the options he purchases. Erhun et
al. [36] consider a two-period model in which the manufacturer has two procurement
opportunities and a timing option; an option to purchase after demand has been
realized at an exercise price equal to the supplier’s second period wholesale price.
Unlike the aforementioned contracts we do not consider demand uncertainty or
explicit demand targets. In the particular context which motivates this study, U.S. en-
ergy policy guarantees a market for biofuel via the Renewable Fuel Standard. Rather,
our focus is on the economic feasibility of procuring a target level of biomass, with
a particular emphasis on the impact of competition for scarce land resources. Due
to long production lead times—as opposed to the long capacity building lead times
typically considered in the supply chain literature—the flexibility offered by the afore-
mentioned contract structures is not appropriate in our context. And, in addition to
considering a wholesale (price-only) pay structure, we consider a structure in which
the supplier is paid for the capacity allocated toward production, as opposed to the
amount of output produced.
Capacity (land) allocation is inherent to our biomass procurement problem. In
the supply chain literature, determining capacity is analogous to choosing a maxi-
mum production level. The capacity allocation problem is typically studied in the
context of allocating a fixed supply of homogeneous goods between retailers (buyers).
Cachon and Lariviere [21] model a decentralized supply chain in which a single ca-
pacitated supplier sells to multiple independent retailers. Retailers submit orders to
the supplier in advance of their selling season; if retailer orders exceed the supplier’s
fixed capacity level, a pre-specified allocation mechanism is used to determine each
retailer’s delivered quantity. Cachon and Lariviere [20] study the capacity allocation
problem using past sales to determine a retailer’s allocation.
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As in our model, the suppliers fixed capacity indirectly results in competition be-
tween otherwise independent sources purchasing the suppliers products. However, in
our model the supplier determines her optimal allocation between distinct products—
as opposed to allocation of a single product between distinct buyers—and she has no
influence over total capacity in any stage. Because we assume the supplier produces
one product for a spot market and one under contract, the “competition” for capacity
is one-sided and indirect. With full information, the buyer offering a contract under
this type of competition can use his knowledge of spot market conditions, as well
as conditions in his own market, to influence the supplier’s choice of allocation. We
are interested in a profit maximizing buyer’s (biorefinery) design and use of contract
terms as a means of securing a share of the supplier’s (farmer) scarce capacity (land)
resource.
To our knowledge, Mazzola and Schantz [78] is the only paper that considers
a capacitated supplier who must decide how to allocate her fixed resource between
distinct production processes. They, however, consider the allocation problem from
the perspective of (dis)economies of scope. We assume no jointness in the production
process for the contracted and commodity good so that (dis)economies of scope is
not an issue.4 Jointness does arise, however, through allocation of the fixed capacity
resource. For more on jointness in agricultural production due to fixed but allocatable
inputs see [102, 74, 84].
Random yields have been studied extensively in the context of production–inventory
systems; see [126] for a review. We are not aware of any papers that address ran-
dom yield or random supply in a capacitated supply chain context. Supply (yield)
uncertainty is important in an agricultural producer’s decision process. We make two
4In other words, we assume there are no interdependencies in the production process such as
equipment sharing, scheduling complementarities/conflicts, or co-production.
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assumptions which reduce supply uncertainty to its simplest form: agricultural pro-
ducer’s who contract are risk neutral, and the random shock which effects the supply
of biomass available at harvest is independent of the producer’s land allocation.5 As
such, supply uncertainty can be characterized by its mean (expected value).
Contracting in an agricultural context has been taken up by Boyabatli et al. [16]
and Burer et al. [18]. Boyabatli et al. model optimal procurement in the beef supply
chain when a packer can contract for cattle and make purchases on the spot market.
They consider window contracts, in which the contract price is a linear function of
the spot price. Burer et al. consider coordination in the agricultural seed industry. A
single supplier determines contract terms with the goal of coordinating the ordering
decisions of independent dealers who in turn, sell seed to farmers. They consider
a pure bonus system in which dealers receive a bonus when sales meet or exceed a
target fraction of his order quantity, and a mixed system which adds a penalty to
the bonus system for falling short of selling a specified fraction of the order quantity.
The wholesale price at which seeds are sold to dealers is exogenous to the model; the
supplier determines the target fractions, bonus and penalty payments.
Agricultural contracting has been studied most prominently in the livestock sector.
However, the literature on contracting for field crops is limited. Major field crops,
oilseeds and grains, are predominantly sold as commodities. However, the recent
increase in demand for special attributes that are costly to identify in spot markets,
and several other factors, has led to an increase in the value of contracted field crop
production [75]. The literature addressing this area has been slow to follow.
592 percent of the agricultural production under contract in 2008 was on commercial farms [76].
The uncertainty we consider here is that due to unfamiliarity in producing a new crop, thus, it is
unlikely to vary with the scale at which the new crop is adopted.
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2.3 Model Framework
Consider a two-echelon supply chain with a single multi-product supplier (e.g., agri-
cultural producer) and a single manufacturer (e.g., biorefinery). There is a non-
substitutable (critical) component required by the manufacturer’s production process
which can only be produced by the supplier (e.g., biomass feedstock). The supplier
has fixed production capacity (e.g., land) which she must decide how to allocate be-
tween various commodity products and the critical component at the beginning of the
period. The supplier’s production process is characterized by a long lead time, sunk
costs and yield uncertainty in production of the critical component. Consequently,
once capacity has been allocated adjustments cannot be made and the output for
each product is not realized until the end of the period.6
The commodities produced by the supplier are sold on the spot (commodity)
market. The manufacturer’s industry, on the other hand, is still nascent. There are
not enough buyers and sellers for a spot market to exist for the critical component. In
order to guarantee supply of the critical component, the manufacturer must establish
a contractual arrangement with the supplier.
The supplier’s total capacity L is allocated between products i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Capacity allocated to product i, denoted Li, has per unit capacity cost ci. However,
before the supplier can produce any of the manufacturer’s components, an additional
fixed set up cost s is incurred. Total output of product i is an increasing, twice-
continuously differentiable, concave function of the allocated capacity, given by Qi =
fi(Li) ≡ (βi − δiLi)Li.7 Output of the critical component, however, is subject to
6Typically the supply chain literature assumes that capacity and production are independent
decisions. In our case, however, by choosing capacity, the supplier simultaneously chooses her
expected production quantity.
7This particular output function decreases marginal output per unit capacity as a linear function
of the allocated capacity [58]. In the context of agricultural production, it can be used to reflect
reductions in yield as a result of varying land quality or a supplier’s preference for diversification.
We assume the supplier’s capacity endowment is such that marginal output is always non-negative.
In other words, f ￿i(L) ≥ 0 ∀i.
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a random, positive, multiplicative yield shock ￿̃ with cumulative distribution G(·),
probability density function g(·), support [￿, ￿] (0 ≤ ￿ < ￿ < ∞) and finite mean.
Thus, total output for the critical component, which we designate with index n, is
Qn(Ln, ￿̃) ≡ fn(Ln)y(￿̃). We assume the output function, fn(·), is independent of the
yield distribution G(·); also, y(￿) ≥ 0 and y￿(￿̃) > 0.
Common knowledge and full information are assumed; both the supplier and
manufacturer have the same beliefs regarding the yield distribution, and all cost and
market parameters are known by both parties. We assume the spot price for each
commodity i is a random variable that is independent of the prices and yields of all
commodities and has expected value p = (p1, . . . , pn−1).8 For simplicity and ease
of exposition we analyze the case in which the supplier produces one (aggregate)
commodity good and the critical component (i.e., n = 2).
The manufacturer is a price-taker in the market for his end product (e.g. biofuel)
but a Stackelberg leader in any contractual arrangement entered with the supplier.
The manufacturer faces an exogenously determined (retail) price with expected value
α and constant marginal processing cost k for each unit of his end product. He
procures the critical component from the supplier at contract price ω and transforms
it into a unit of the end product at the fixed input-output ratio γ. A timeline of the
game is illustrated in Figure 1.
2.3.1 Notation
From here on we use terminology consistent with our specific application. The farmer
(supplier) must determine how to allocate her fixed land (capacity) resource to-
ward the production of commodity (food) crops for the spot market and energy
crops/biomass (components) under contract for a biorefinery (manufacturer). For
convenient reference we list the notation used throughout this dissertation. Decision
8We assume the spot price is independent of commodity yields since we are considering a single
farmer in a competitive industry.
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Figure 1: Sequence of Events
variables are designated (DV), random variables are designated (RV).
2.4 Supply Chain Structures
2.4.1 Integrated Supply Chain
Volume and profit are key indicators of a viable biofuel industry. As a benchmark
we consider a channel in which the biorefinery and farm are vertically integrated; the
biorefinery owns and operates the cropland, for example. We assume, however, that
the vertically integrated channel will only use cropland for the production of energy
crops. The biorefinery can sell all of the biofuel it produces at the market price α.9
In the integrated system, the amount of land used to grow energy crops maximizes
expected profit from biofuel production:
E[ΠI ] = max
0≤L2≤L
E[γ(α− k)f2(L2)y(￿̃)− c2L2 − s] (1)
The unique optimal land use for energy crop production in the integrated system is:
LI2 = min{L￿I , L} (2)






We focus on the case in which the fixed set up cost s is not prohibitively large so
9For example, there is a guaranteed market for biofuel due to laws mandating its use.
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Table 1: Model Notation
Notation Description
i = {1, 2} Commodity (food) and energy crop index, respectively
j = {W,CP} Wholesale and capacity procurement contract index, respectively
c1 Marginal cost of commodity crop production (per unit area)
c2 Marginal cost of energy crop production (per unit area)
p Expected spot price (commodity crop)
L Total land (area) available
s Fixed set up cost for energy crop production
Li Land allocated toward crop i (DV)
βi Maximum yield of crop i per unit area
δi Marginal yield reduction rate of crop i
fi(Li) Production function for crop i
y(￿̃) Random fraction of energy crop output realized at harvest (RV)
Qi(·) Units of crop i available for sale (RV)
g(·) Probability density function (pdf) for yield shock ￿̃
G(·) Cumulative distribution function (cdf) for yield shock ￿̃
µ Mean (expected) fraction of energy crop output at harvest
ω Contract price offered by the biorefinery to the farmer (DV)
α Expected retail price of biofuel
k Marginal biofuel production cost
γ Biofuel input-output ratio (units biofuel per unit energy crop)
E[·] Expected value operator
LI2 Optimal land use for energy crop production in the integrated supply
chain
Lji (ω) Equilibrium land allocation toward crop i under contract type j at
contract price ω
ωj Equilibrium contract price under contract type j
ΠjB(ω) Biorefinery profit under contract type j at contract price ω
ΠjF ￿(ω) Farmer profit from energy crop production under contract type j at
contract price ω







type j at contract price ω
ΠI Integrated supply chain profit
ΠNCF Farmer profit from commodity production alone (reservation profit)
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that E[ΠI(LI2)] is non-negative. The optimal land use for energy crop production de-
scribed in (3) is the first-best solution for the supply chain. Given anticipated market
conditions (α), costs (c2 and k), the state of technology (γ, β2, and δ2), and mean
energy crop production (µ = E[y(￿̃)]), LI2 is the profit maximizing land use for energy
crop production and µγf2(LI2) is the economic optimal (expected) biofuel production
level. If the farmer and biorefinery can agree upon terms of trade (contract param-
eters) which align their individual objectives with those of the integrated system,
then the supply chain can achieve optimal performance and we say the decentralized
system is coordinated. In other words, the decentralized supply chain which consists
of the farmer and biorefinery will be coordinated if the biorefinery’s contract terms
induce the farmer to allocate the same amount of land toward energy crop production
as would be allocated under vertical integration.
Typically, decentralized supply chains act suboptimally due to the double marginal-
ization effect first noted by Spengler [103]. Each firm in the supply chain seeks to
maximize the profit earned on products sold downstream, but each firm only considers
its own profit maximization problem when making its decisions, as opposed to profit
of the entire system. The succession of local profit maximization decisions leads to
higher prices, lower quantities and reduced consumer welfare, as compared to an inte-
grated channel where decisions are made to maximize profit of the entire supply chain.
In our system, profit maximization and competition between production alternatives
drive the discrepancy between local and system optimum behaviors. We make a dis-
tinction between system inefficiency due to double marginalization and that resulting
from (indirect) competition for the farmer’s limited land resource, which we call the
commodity market effect. The former is the misalignment between local and global
decisions which results from the biorefinery’s pricing decision, whereas the latter is
the misalignment resulting from the farmer’s alternative production opportunities.
In the following sections we analyze wholesale and capacity procurement contracts
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and evaluate their ability to align the decentralized system’s performance with that
of the integrated system. Performance is measured by both the land allocated toward
energy crop production and the resulting supply chain profit. Our objectives are to
understand the factors which enable energy crops to compete with traditional com-
modity crops for scarce land as well as the effects of competition on contract terms
and profit. We seek to answer the following questions: 1) When is the biorefinery
willing to offer contract terms which induce the first-best land allocation? 2) What
effect does the farmer’s outside opportunity (spot market food production) have on
the decentralized system’s performance? 3) How does the farmer’s outside opportu-
nity affect her strength (share of total profits) within the supply chain? and 4) Which
contract type is “best” for each agent; and which is best for the system?
2.4.2 Willingness to Participate
Before any contracts are proposed, the farmer only produces commodity crops for the
spot market. In this business as usual scenario, which we label NC for “no contract,”
the farmer’s land use and profit are respectively,
LNC1 ≡ argmax
0≤L1≤L
pf1(L1) − c1L1 = min {LC , L} (3)
E[ΠNCF ] ≡ pf1(LNC1 ) − c1LNC1 (4)






The farmer is willing to participate in energy crop production (i.e., the farmer accepts
the contract) if her expected profit under the stated contractual arrangement with
the biorefinery is at least as great as her profit under spot market production only.
Therefore, E[ΠNCF ] is the farmer’s reservation profit, or the minimum expected profit
she requires in order to grow any energy crops.
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2.4.3 Wholesale Price Contract
The terms of a wholesale contract require the biorefinery to pay ω for each unit
of biomass produced by the farmer. Since the biorefinery only pays for the units
actually produced, the farmer bears much of the risk in production. If the realized
biomass yield is low, the farmer not only misses out on the profit that could have been
earned by allocating that land toward commodity production, but she also faces direct
losses due to the set up and production costs of biomass. We begin our analysis by
considering the farmer’s response to the biorefinery offering a wholesale price contract
to produce energy crops at compensation rate ω per unit biomass.
2.4.3.1 Farmer’s Problem
Given she accepts the contract, the farmer’s optimal land allocation is the solution
to the following problem:
E[ΠWF (ω)] = max
L1≥0
L2≥0
E[ ωf2(L2)y(￿̃) + pf1(L1)− c1L1 − c2L2 − s ]
s.t. L1 + L2 ≤ L (5)
Lemma 1. The farmer’s objective function is concave in the allocation decision.
Proof. It is straight forward to show that the Hessian matrix for (5) is negative
definite.
Proposition 1. Assuming the land constraint is binding, the farmer’s optimal allo-
cation {LW1 , LW2 } satisfies:
i) LW1 = L, L
W
2 = 0 if µωf
￿
2(0) − c2 ≤ pf ￿1(L) − c1
ii) LW1 = 0, L
W
2 = L if µωf
￿
2(L) − c2 ≥ pf ￿1(0) − c1
iii) LW1 = L− LW2 , LW2 > 0 if µωf ￿2(LW2 ) − c2 = pf ￿1(L− LW2 ) − c1
Proposition 1 (Kuhn–Tucker conditions when the Lagrange multiplier is positive)
illustrates the relationship between relative profitability of the farmer’s production
19
alternatives and optimal land allocation. We ignore result i) in which the farmer does
not accept the biorefinery’s contract. Results ii) and iii) give the conditions under
which the farmer should dedicate some (iii), or all (ii), of her land toward energy
crop production.
In this analysis, and that of subsequent contract types, we restrict our analytical
focus to the case in which the farmer’s land constraint is binding and it is optimal to
allocate only a portion of her land toward biomass production. A binding land con-
straint means it is optimal for the farmer to grow more commodities and/or biomass,
however, she is limited by land availability. We restrict our analysis to this binding
case since we are most interested in the potential use of productive cropland for dedi-
cated energy crop production. When considering marginal lands on which commodity
production is costly and yields are low, this restriction would not be appropriate. Fo-
cusing on the case in which it is optimal to produce both commodity and energy
crops allows us to study the important interactions between spot market conditions
and contract production, as well as the indirect competition that can occur due to
scarcity of the farmer’s land resource.
Therefore, concentrating on result iii), when offered an acceptable wholesale con-
tract the farmer’s optimal land allocation, after substituting our particular production
functions, is:
LW1 (ω) =
pβ1 − c1 + 2µωδ2L− µωβ2 + c2
2(pδ1 + µωδ2)
LW2 (ω) =
µωβ2 − c2 + 2pδ1L − pβ1 + c1
2(pδ1 + µωδ2)
(6)
Land allocated toward energy crop production depends not only on the contract
price, production cost and yield uncertainty, but also on the expected spot price
and cost of commodity production. Note that the fixed set up cost, s, does not
affect the land allocation decision. It only affects the farmer’s decision of whether or
not to accept the contract. The farmer will accept the biorefinery’s contract and
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produce energy crops only if her individual rationality (participation) constraint,
E[ΠWF (ω)] ≥ E[ΠNCF ], is satisfied.





increasing in: p, c2, β1, δ2, and L





increasing in: µ, ω, c1, β2, δ1, and L
decreasing in: p, c2, β1, and δ2
As relative profitability of commodity production increases—either through an in-
crease (decrease) in the spot (wholesale) price, or a decrease (increase) in the marginal
cost of producing commodities (energy crops)—the farmer’s optimal decision is to allo-
cate less land toward biomass production. So, for a fixed contract price, the existence
of a commodity market (spot market) tends to further misalign the farmer’s objective
from that of the integrated system, as compared to the case in which there is only
a double marginalization effect. The converse is true when relative profitability of
biomass increases. When the biorefinery offers favorable contract terms, or expected
biomass yield is high, the farmer prefers to allocate more land toward energy crop
production. Note also the role of technology, βi and δi, in the farmer’s decision; land
allocation favors the product with the higher yield. As should be expected, a risk
neutral farmer will allocate more land toward the more profitable endeavor.10 We
evaluate the biorefinery’s ability to exploit the farmer’s land allocation rule in order
to secure his desired supply of feedstock.
10Comparative static results for c1, c2, µ, ω, p, and L hold for any increasing, concave production
functions fi(Li), not just the particular function considered here. The comparative static results for




Let QW2 (ω) ≡ f2(LW2 (ω))y(￿̃) be the feedstock supply when the biorefinery offers
contract price ω. The biorefinery seeks to maximize expected profit from the sale of
biofuel, subject to the farmer accepting his offer to produce the required biomass. To
avoid trivial solutions we assume γ(α− k) ≥ ω.




(γ(α− k)− ω) QW2 (ω)
￿
s.t. E[ΠWF (ω)] ≥ E[ΠNCF ] (7)
Let ω(LW2 ) denote the farmer’s inverse land allocation function;
11 it is the wholesale
price which induces the farmer to allocate LW2 units of land toward energy crop
production. The biorefinery can induce his desired (expected) supply of biomass by
offering the appropriate wholesale price. For a fixed ω < γ(α − k) the biorefinery’s
profit is non-decreasing in QW2 . Therefore, there is no incentive for the biorefinery to
breach the contract and purchase less biomass than is actually produced in the event
that the farmer realizes an exceptionally high yield.
The farmer’s participation constraint is concave in ω so Kuhn–Tucker (KKT)
conditions are not sufficient to guarantee a unique optimal solution to the biorefinery’s
contract pricing problem (7). However, since f2(·) is quadratic, if we let ω￿ and
ω￿￿ denote the solutions to E[ΠWF (ω)] = E[Π
NC
F ], with ω
￿ < ω￿￿ and substitute
into the farmer’s allocation response function (6), we obtain L2(ω￿) < 0 < L2(ω￿￿).
Since L2(ω) is increasing in ω, and E[ΠWF ] is increasing in L2, we can replace the
problematic participation constraint E[ΠWF (ω)] ≥ E[ΠNCF ], with a lower bound on
the contract price. We denote ω￿￿W the farmer’s minimum acceptable wholesale price;
it is the wholesale price at which energy crops can be added to the crop mix without
reducing her total expected profit. Replacing the participation constraint with the
11Since L2 is increasing monotonically in ω the inverse exists.
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linear bound, we rewrite the biorefinery’s problem as:




(γ(α− k)− ω) QW2 (ω)
￿
s.t. ω ≥ ω￿￿W (8)
Lemma 2. The biorefinery’s expected profit is concave in ω.
Proposition 2. There is a unique contract price ωW which solves the biorefinery’s
reduced problem (8). ωW = max{ω∗W , ω￿￿W} where:















ω￿￿W is the farmer’s minimum acceptable wholesale price
Proof. In substituting the farmer’s participation constraint for a (linear) lower bound
on the contract price, any contract price satisfying the Kuhn–Tucker maximum condi-
tions will satisfy the Kuhn–Tucker sufficient conditions and be the global maximizer
of biorefinery profits. The solution can take one of three forms: an interior, non-
binding solution; a boundary solution; or a local solution. The interior solution
occurs when the biorefinery’s (unconstrained) optimal contract price is strictly larger
than the farmer’s minimum acceptable contract price. A boundary solution occurs
when the (unconstrained) optimal contract price is equal to the minimum acceptable
price. Though the constraint holds with equality, it is not binding since the biore-
finery cannot earn a higher profit by offering a lower contract price. Lastly, a local
solution occurs when the minimum acceptable contract price is binding. In this case,
the biorefinery’s profit is maximized at a wholesale price less than ω￿￿W , but the farmer
will not accept any contract offering a price lower than ω￿￿W . Therefore, as long as
ω￿￿W ≤ γ(α − k), the biorefinery will offer the minimum acceptable contract price
since he still expects to earn positive profit.
In case of an interior or boundary solution we obtain the equilibrium contract
price by solving the biorefinery’s unconstrained problem. Setting the biorefinery’s
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marginal profit equal to zero and solving for ω we obtain the unique solution:















Otherwise, when the constraint is binding ωW = ω￿￿W .
Our constraint substitution works because of the the specific form of the pro-
duction function used. However, for a general increasing and concave production
function fi(·), KKT maximum conditions for problem (7) are necessary and sufficient










where, K1 = −f ￿￿1 (LW1 (ω)), and K2 = −f ￿￿2 (LW2 (ω)).
Condition 2 E[ΠWF (ω)] is quasiconcave in ω.
Otherwise, the optimal contract price can be found via an exhaustive search over all
ω in the region [0, γ(α− k)]. See appendix for proof.
Proposition 3. When the farmer’s participation constraint is non-binding the biore-
finery’s marginal cost of procurement is greater than the contract price ω∗W but de-
creasing in the price elasticity of biomass supply.







denote the price elasticity of biomass
supply when the farmer allocates LW2 (ω) units of land toward energy crop production.
Rearranging (9) we obtain,





















The term γ(α − k) expresses the return on biofuel production measured in terms of
biomass. It is the revenue earned on each unit of biofuel, net of production costs,
and adjusted by the fixed input-output ratio so that it is measured in dollars per
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unit biomass. It reflects the revenue earned on each unit of biomass procured. Since
marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost in optimality, the marginal cost of an




by (10). Price elasticity of supply is either
inelastic (0 < σ < 1), unitary elastic (σ = 1), or elastic (σ > 1). Therefore, the
marginal cost of procuring biomass is greater than the price paid for each unit of
biomass and decreasing in elasticity.12
The biorefinery’s marginal cost reflects both the price paid for a unit of biomass
as well as the cost of inducing production of that unit of biomass. The farmer’s
inverse land allocation curve ω(LW2 ) is increasing and convex in L
W
2 due to diminishing
returns. Consequently, inducing more land, and thus additional biomass, becomes
increasingly costly for the biorefinery. The biorefinery must offer a higher contract
price to induce additional supply, but that higher price must be paid to all units
produced, not just the additional units, thus the marginal cost of additional biomass
is greater than the wholesale price. However, when supply is elastic, marginal cost
is mitigated since the additional biomass induced is greater than the price increase.
The implication of this result, which holds for any increasing concave production
function f(·), is that a profit maximizing biorefinery facing increasing marginal costs
and constant marginal revenue tends to desire less biomass and produce less biofuel.
Proposition 4. The (unconstrained) optimal biofuel production level (integrated sys-
tem production) is not profitable when the biorefinery must procure biomass feedstock
using a wholesale contract.13
Proof. Recall that we assume an interior solution with binding constraint for the
12Note σW ≥ 0 by our assumption that f ￿2(L) > 0.
13When the integrated system is sufficiently constrained by land availability there are circumstances
under which the decentralized supply chain achieves system optimal performance. This issue will be
taken up explicitly in §2.5 but for now we assume LI2 = L￿I ≤ L.
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For coordination, we require LW2 (ω) = L
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But the biorefinery would never offer that wholesale price since it leads to negative
(expected) profit.
E[ΠWB ] = µ[γ(α− k)− ωIW ]f2(LI2)
= −µγ(α− k)
￿






Therefore, ωW < ωIW , L
W
2 (ω
W ) < LI2, and µγf2(L
W
2 ) < µγf2(L
I
2).
In our discussion of Corollary 1 we concluded that the existence of a commodity
market misaligned integrated and decentralized system performance further than just
the double marginalization effect. The proof of Proposition 4, see (12), provides a
mathematical representation of the distortion between decentralized and integrated
objectives which can be attributed to the farmer’s spot market participation. In the
farmer’s problem, an interior solution with binding constraint implies
pf ￿1(L − LI2) − c1 > 0. As a result, only a contract price greater than the (per
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unit) return on biofuel can induce the integrated land allocation. In other words, the
system cannot be coordinated unless the biorefinery operates at a loss.
In the absence of a spot market, or if the farmer’s land constraint is not binding
(i.e., pf ￿1(L − LI2) − c1 = 0), the decentralized supply chain could overcome the
double marginalization effect and achieve coordination, but only if the biorefinery
were willing to offer a contract price equal to his net return; i.e., ω = γ(α − k). In
which case, the biorefinery would expect to breakeven while the farmer captured all
of the supply chain profit. Offering ω = γ(α−k) cannot be an equilibrium, however,
since the biorefinery could improve his own profit by decreasing the wholesale price.
So while double marginalization alone discourages coordination in the decentralized
system, the commodity market makes coordination impossible. Therefore, if the first-
best solution is the scale of agricultural participation required to take full advantage
of available profit in the market for biofuel, the wholesale contract would not be
structured to achieve this level.
So far, we have assumed the farmer’s reservation profit does not constrain the
biorefinery’s choice of contract price. The following theorem illustrates the effect of
a binding participation constraint on supply chain performance.
Theorem 1. Let ω∗W denote the biorefinery’s preferred contract price (i.e., the biore-
finery’s unconstrained solution).Then, for ω∗W < ￿ω ≤ γ(α− k):
i) LW2 (ω
∗
W ) < L
W
2 (￿ω) < LI2
ii) E[ΠWF (ω
∗





W )] < E[Π
W
SC(￿ω)] < E[ΠI ]
The superscript I denotes the integrated system’s optimal outcome (3), the sub-
script SC denotes supply chain profit, E[ΠWSC(ω)] = E[Π
W
F ￿(ω)] + E[Π
W
B (ω)], and
the subscript F ￿ is used to indicate that only the profit earned from energy crop
production is included in the supply chain calculation.
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Proof.
i) By Corollary 1, ω∗W < ￿ω implies LW2 (ω∗W ) < LW2 (￿ω). From first-order con-
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2 (ω)) > 0 by Proposition 1–iii)
Therefore, ω∗W < ￿ω implies E[ΠWF (ω∗W )] < E[ΠWF (￿ω)].
iii) Suppose not. Suppose instead, that
E[ΠWF ￿(ω
∗
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The direction of inequality in (15) is reversed owing to i). Referring back to the
first-order conditions in the integrated system, the inequality in (15) cannot hold
since, for any land allocation less than the integrated allocation LI2, the slope of
the production function is greater than
c2





E[ΠWSC(￿ω)]. The proof of E[ΠWSC(￿ω)] < E[ΠI ] follows similarly.
In Theorem 1 we see that increasing the contract price improves the decentral-
ized system performance by reducing the double marginalization effect. By inducing
greater land allocation, farmer profit increases at the expense of biorefinery profit, but
by enough to boost total supply chain profit. Therefore, if the farmer’s participation
constraint is binding, the system operates at a level closer to that of the integrated
channel. Because a binding participation constraint can result from a large fixed set
up cost or a large reservation profit (E[ΠNCF ]), the result in Theorem 1 may seem
to contradict our previous result that a profitable spot market tends to reduce the
amount of land allocated to energy crops (Corollary 1). This apparent contradiction
is resolved, however, when we consider biorefinery and farmer response to spot market
conditions concurrently.
In determining the contract terms, the biorefinery must account for the farmer’s
fixed set up cost and opportunity cost if he is to offer a contract the farmer would be
willing to accept. The larger the farmer’s opportunity cost—e.g., the more profitable
the spot market—the higher the contract price has to be to induce participation. But
the farmer makes her allocation decision at the margin. Thus, she only considers
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the contract price, spot price, production costs and marginal yields when deciding
how much land to devote to biomass production. Consequently, at the margin the
contract price is relatively high, thus inducing greater land allocation toward energy
crops. Stated another way, the farmer’s reservation profit does not change her land
allocation rule, it only dictates whether she will accept the contract or not. So, if
her reservation profit forces the biorefinery to offer a higher contract price than that
which maximizes his profit, the energy crop allocation will be greater (than if the
biorefinery offered his profit maximizing contract price) since L2 is increasing in ω.
The farmer benefits from increased revenue due to both a higher wholesale price and
more output, while system performance improves since the increase in biomass suply
allows for greater biofuel production and sales.
We have shown that under a wholesale contract structure: 1) there are no mutually
beneficial contract terms which support the system optimal allocation of land toward
energy crop production, hence optimal biofuel production; 2) while coordination is not
possible, when the profit outlook in the commodity market is sufficiently optimistic,
the biorefinery must sacrifice some of its profit to ensure participation which improves
system performance by reducing the double marginalization effect; and 3) the farmer
benefits from the improved system performance by capturing a larger share of total
supply chain profit.
2.4.4 Capacity Procurement Contract
A capacity procurement contract requires the biorefinery to pay ω for each unit of
land allocated toward the production of biomass, as opposed to paying per unit
biomass produced as in the wholesale contract. Therefore, regardless of the realized
yield, the farmer is guaranteed income in the amount ωL2; and, essentially all of
the production risk is transferred from the farmer to the biorefinery. The DuPont
Corp., in partnership with the University of Tennessee, offered sixteen farmers in
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Vonore, Tennessee what we call capacity procurement contracts to grow switchgrass
for the first pilot-scale cellulosic ethanol biorefinery [63]. The farmers who accepted
the contract dedicated a portion of their total land resource toward the production
of switchgrass.
In modeling a capacity procurement contract we assume a forced compliance
regime (see [22] for a discussion on forced and voluntary compliance in supply chain
contracting). If the biorefinery were unable to monitor the farmer’s actions, the
farmer could accept ω without making any investments in land preparation, thereby
earning something for nothing. The following analysis assumes it is not too costly
for the biorefinery to monitor the farmer’s actions at the beginning of the period.14
Therefore, if biomass supply is low at the end of the period, it is a result of the yield
shock, not intentional negligence on the part of the farmer.
2.4.4.1 Farmer’s Problem
A farmer faced with a capacity procurement contract seeks to solve the following
profit maximization problem:
E[ΠCPF (ω)] = max
L1≥0
L2≥0
E[(ω − c2)L2 + pf1(L1)− c1L1 − s]
s.t. L1 + L2 ≤ L (16)
The farmer’s objective function is concave, and there is a unique allocation which max-
imizes profit. Provided the capacity procurement price is greater than the marginal
cost of production c2 and sufficient to recover the fixed set up cost, the farmer’s
land constraint will be binding. Again, assuming it is optimal for the farmer to pro-
duce both commodity crops and energy crops, her land allocation when offered an
14Assume these monitoring costs have been built in to the contract price.
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acceptable capacity procurement contract is:15
LCP1 (ω) =
pβ1 − c1 − ω + c2
2pδ1
LCP2 (ω) =
2pδ1L + ω − c2 − pβ1 + c1
2pδ1
(17)






increasing in: p, c2, and β1





increasing in: ω, c1, δ1, and L
decreasing in: p, c2, and β1
As with the wholesale contract, the optimal energy crop allocation under the
capacity procurement contract structure is increasing in ω, c1, δ1 and L. However,
the farmer’s allocation decision is now independent of the energy crop’s production
function and the risks associated with yield. Also, unlike under wholesale contract,
the farmer’s commodity allocation decision is independent of the total land available.
So for a given contract price, the farmer always dedicates LCP1 , regardless of her total
land availability. This suggests that, from the biorefinery’s perspective, capacity
procurement contracts may be particularly desirable when dealing with farmers who
have a large land endowment.
2.4.4.2 Biorefinery’s Problem
Under capacity procurement contract, the biorefinery assumes all of the production
risk. Therefore, he must choose a contract price large enough to encourage farmer





ω − c2 + c1
p
LCP2 (ω) = L− LCP1 (ω)
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participation, but low enough to mitigate against the risk of low yield. Let QCP2 (ω) ≡
f2(LCP2 (ω))y(￿̃) be the biomass supply when offering capacity procurement price ω.
The biorefinery chooses the contract price ωCP which maximizes expected profit
E[ΠCPB ] = max
ω≥0
E[γ(α− k)QCP2 (ω)− ωLCP2 (ω)]
s.t. E[ΠCPF (ω)] ≥ E[ΠNCF ] (18)
Proposition 5. i) The biorefinery’s profit function is concave in the contract price
ω; ii) the unique contract price which maximizes the biorefinery’s expected profit is
ωCP = max{ω∗CP , ω￿￿CP} where


















ω￿￿CP is the farmer’s minimum acceptable contract price
Proof. i) The biorefinery’s marginal profit is:
dE[ΠCPB ]
dω









− LCP2 (ω) (20)














































Thus, the biorefinery’s expected profit under capacity procurement contract is concave
in ω.
ii) As under the wholesale contract structure, the farmer’s participation constraint
can be replaced by the linear lower bound constraint, ω ≥ ω￿￿CP , so that KKT con-
ditions are necessary and sufficient. Again, there are three possible solutions: an
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interior solution with non-binding constraint (ωCP = ω∗CP > ω
￿￿
CP ); a boundary
solution with non-binding constraint (ωCP = ω∗CP = ω
￿￿
CP ); and a local solution
characterized by the binding constraint (ωCP = ω￿￿CP > ω
∗
CP ). When the constraint
is non-binding, the optimal contract price ω∗CP is obtained by setting (20) equal to
zero and solving for ω.
As with the wholesale contract, when the farmer’s participation constraint is non-
binding the biorefinery’s marginal cost of procuring land is greater than the optimal





















The term on the left is the expected marginal revenue earned from an additional unit
of land, the term on the right is the marginal cost. The relationship indicates the








When introducing the capacity procurement contract, we stated the biorefinery
bears all of the production risk. And indeed, the farmer’s profit maximization problem
is independent of the amount of biomass actually produced. But when the farmer’s
participation constraint is not binding, the biorefinery is able to share some of this
production risk by basing contract terms, in part, on expected marginal biomass yield.
Proposition 6. The (unconstrained) optimal biofuel production level is profitable
when the biorefinery procures biomass feedstock using a capacity procurement contract
provided γ(α− k), is sufficiently large.
Proof. See appendix.
Under the wholesale contract structure we showed that, at best, the biorefinery
could expect to break even when offering a coordinating contract. And that best case
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scenario hinged on the spot market being sufficiently weak. Theorem 6 shows that
under the capacity procurement contract structure, coordination is feasible provided
biofuel market conditions are sufficiently favorable. We note, however, that while
coordination is feasible (both parties receive non-negative profit) it is not an equi-
librium outcome since the biorefinery prefers to offer a contract price less than the
coordinating price ωICP .
When offered a capacity procurement contract, the farmer’s allocation decision is
linear in the contract price ω. As a result, the inverse supply function is linear, making
it less costly for the biorefinery to induce greater energy crop allocation, relative to
the wholesale contract scenario in which each additional unit of land allocated is
more costly than the previous. Furthermore, because the biorefinery is able to pass
on some of the production risk—unlike the farmer under a wholesale contract—he
doesn’t have to bear the cost of greater allocation alone. Therefore, even though
biomass yield is decreasing (due to diminishing returns) while costs increase as the
contract price approaches ωICP , when the net return is large enough, the biorefinery
can still achieve positive profits.
Inducing the system optimal energy crop allocation does, however, lead to sub-
stantial reductions in profit for the biorefinery. We use the following to designate the
lowest net return such that the coordinating contract (ω = ωICP ) is profitable for both
the farmer and biorefinery:
rCP ≡ inf{γ(α− k) : E[ΠCPB (ωICP )] > 0}.
Theorem 2. Let ω∗CP and ω
I
CP denote the biorefinery’s optimal (unconstrained) con-
tract price and the contract price which induces coordination, respectively. Then, for
γ(α− k) > rCP and ω∗CP < ￿ω ≤ ωICP :
i) LCP2 (ω
∗
CP ) < L
CP
2 (￿ω) ≤ LI2
ii) E[ΠCPSC (ω
∗
CP )] < E[Π
CP



















i) First we show that LCP2 (ω
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∂ω > 0 (Corollary 2) and ω
∗
CP must be greater than









CP ) < L
I
2. Therefore, again by Corollary 2,
LCP2 (ω
∗
CP ) < L
CP
2 (￿ω) ≤ LI2.
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CP ) < Π
CP
F ￿ (￿ω). By Theorem 6, for
γ(α− k) > rCP , E[ΠCPB (￿ω)] > 0. But, since ω∗CP is optimal for the biorefinery





















In Theorem 2 we see that supply chain profit is increasing in the capacity procure-
ment price but the biorefinery’s share is decreasing. The farmer is able to capture an
increasing share of total supply chain profit because her revenue is increasing and con-
vex in ω while her costs only increase linearly. Meanwhile, the biorefinery’s costs are
increasing and convex but revenue increases at a decreasing rate. So while increasing
the contract price can lead to coordination of the supply chain, the biorefinery must
sacrifice his own profit in order to do so.
From a managerial perspective, Theorem 2 implies that if a biorefinery is con-
cerned with achieving an ideal (expected) biofuel production level, offering a potential
supplier a capacity procurement contract provides the flexibility to balance profit and
production goals. If in the short-term it is more important to meet the production
goals (e.g., the integrated channel’s production level) than it is to achieve maximal
profits, then the biorefinery should offer a capacity procurement contract with the
coordinating contract price ωICP , provided expected net return meets the criteria.
Otherwise, if profit is more important, the biorefinery should offer ω∗CP . It is also
interesting to note that the commodity market has less of an effect on system perfor-
mance under the capacity procurement structure than under the wholesale contract
structure, as illustrated by Corollary 2 and Proposition 6.
We have shown that under a capacity procurement contract structure: 1) inte-
grated performance is feasible although not an equilibrium outcome; 2) when the
profit outlook in the commodity market is sufficiently optimistic system performance
improves; and 3) the farmer benefits from the improved system performance by cap-
turing a larger share of total supply chain profit.
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2.5 Contract Comparisons
We have presented two contracts in use, or likely to be used, to encourage feedstock
production for biofuels. We have found that wholesale contracts do not allow for co-
ordination of the supply chain even when competition from the commodity market is
relatively weak. We have also shown that the capacity procurement contract structure
allows for flexibility in achieving production level and profit goals since coordination
is feasible under certain biofuel market conditions.
Which contract structure is “best”? From the supply chain perspective, the
best contract is the most efficient, defined as the ratio of decentralized supply chain
profit to integrated supply chain profit [19]. When competition is moderate so that
the biorefinery is not constrained by the farmer’s minimum profit constraint, then
LCP2 (ω
∗




























The expression in (23) does not lend itself to intuitive economic interpretation so
we compare the wholesale and capacity procurement contracts using a numerical
example. We use corn and switchgrass as representative commodity and energy crops.
Table 2 provides the benchmark parameter values we use in this computational
experiment, along with the range of values used in sensitivity analysis of key exogenous
variables. The production parameters—β1, β2, c1, c2, γ−1, and k—reflect annualized
estimates for corn and switchgrass obtained from the literature [90]. The commodity
price p was obtained from USDA National Agricultural Statistical Service (NASS)
data and the expected biofuel price α was derived from recent gasoline prices using
the energy equivalence of ethanol and gasoline.
Table 3 presents a snapshot comparison of the wholesale and capacity procurement
contracts. Under benchmark conditions the capacity procurement contract is best,
offering both the farmer and biorefinery greater expected profits than the wholesale
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Table 2: Benchmark Parameter Values
Parameter Benchmark Value Description Sensitivity Range
β1 8,655 kg/ha Max commodity yield per area
β2 10,000 kg/ha Max energy crop yield per area [ 5,000, 10,000 ]
δ1 0.1 kg/ha2 Marginal yield reduction rate (commodity)
δ2 0.05 kg/ha2 Marginal yield reduction rate (energy crop) [ 0.001, 0.3 ]
p 0.14 $/kg Commodity price [ 0.11, 0.19 ]
c1 917 $/ha Commodity production cost
c2 230 $/ha Energy crop production cost
L 10,525 ha Total available land resource [ 8,000, 13,000 ]
s 690 $ Fixed set up cost (energy crop)
µ 80 % Expected harvestable output [ 40, 100 ]
γ−1 9.47 kg/gal Input-output ratio (energy crop to biofuel)
α 2.7 $/gal Expected biofuel price [ 2.35, 3.50 ]
k 2.03 $/gal Marginal biofuel production cost
contract. The biorefinery’s share of total system profit is slightly greater under whole-
sale contract than capacity procurement contract. But both contract structures result
in a near 50–50 split of expected system profits between the farmer and biorefinery.
Since the farmer’s minimum acceptable contract price ω￿￿ is not a binding constraint
under these benchmark conditions, the biorefinery finds it optimal to share profits in
this manner. However, at the optimal contract prices ω∗, the farmer is only willing
to allocate approximately half of her land resource toward energy crop production.
We note that the integrated system is constrained by the fixed land resource. Biofuel
market conditions are such that the available land cannot support the desired scale
of biomass production. That the biorefinery finds it optimal to induce only half of
the farmer’s land resource in such biofuel market conditions suggests that competing
with corn (commodity) production is rather costly.
To understand which parameters lead to better system performance and which
lead to significant distinctions in performance quality between the two contract types,
we utilize sensitivity analysis. As in our analytical analysis, we restrict our attention
to the range of values for which the farmer will produce both biomass and food; and
the land resource constraint is binding.
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Farmer’s Min. Price ω￿￿ 0.03 $/kg 236 $/ha —
Biorefinery’s Preferred Price ω∗ 0.05 $/kg 383 $/ha —
Offered Price ωj = max {ω￿￿, ω∗} 0.05 $/kg 383 $/ha —
Land Allocated to Biomass L2(ωj) 5,058 ha 5,449 ha 10,525 ha
Expected Farm Profit E[ΠF ￿ ] $765,819 $830,737 —
Expected Biorefinery Profit E[ΠB ] $860,673 $915,461 —
Farmer Share of SC Profit E[ΠF ￿ ]/E[ΠSC ] 47 % 48 % —
Biorefinery Share of SC Profit E[ΠB ]/E[ΠSC ] 53 % 52 % —
SC Efficiency E[ΠSC ]/E[ΠI ] 50 % 54 % 100 %
Commodity (Food) Price Effect
Under benchmark conditions the span of commodity prices at which both the
commodity (corn) and energy crop are produced is 8 cents per kg ($2 per bushel).
Figure 2 illustrates the effect of expected commodity price on system performance over
that range. Figure 2(a) illustrates the equilibrium wholesale price (dashed line) and
minimum acceptable wholesale price (dotted line); while Figure 2(b) illustrates the
equilibrium (solid line) and minimum acceptable (dotted line) capacity procurement
prices. This convention will be used throughout this section; namely, the dotted
line will depict the minimum acceptable contract price, the dashed line will reflect
equilibrium outcomes under wholesale contract and the solid line will reflect outcomes
under capacity procurement contract.
Interestingly, when the price outlook in the commodity market is rather pessimistic
(low p), so that competition for the farmer’s land resource is weak, the biorefinery
finds it optimal to pay a small premium to secure the desired biomass feedstock.
We refer to the difference between the equilibrium contract price and the minimum
acceptable contract price as the “premium.” Since all other parameters are left at
their benchmark values, this shows that when competition is relatively weak, the
biorefinery is willing to pay a premium in order to secure enough feedstock to take
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(b) Capacity Procurement Price










(c) Energy Crop Allocation
Figure 2: Commodity price effect on equilibrium contract terms and energy crop
allocation in the decentralized supply chain. The dotted line depicts the farmer’s
minimum acceptable contract price; the dashed line depicts equilibrium outcomes
under wholesale contract; the solid line depicts equilibrium outcomes under capacity
procurement contract; and, the dot-dashed line portrays outcomes in the vertically
integrated system.
advantage of favorable conditions in the biofuel market. Recall from the snapshot that
the integrated system is constrained by the land resource under benchmark conditions
in the biofuel market.
The price premium increases at moderate levels of competition, then decreases
as the competition becomes staunch. For p > $0.14/kg expected commodity market
margins are sufficiently high so that the farmer’s land resource constrains her desired
commodity production level (in the absence of a biomass contract). Therefore, her
minimum acceptable contract price increases significantly in this range. Her reluc-
tance to grow energy crops under these commodity market conditions is demonstrated
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in Figure 2(c).
Though competition from the commodity market is an important factor in sys-
tem performance, Figure 2 also illustrates the importance of double marginalization.
In this sensitivity analysis, all parameters except the expected spot price are held at
their benchmark levels. Therefore, the biorefinery can always afford to offer any of the
equilibrium prices in Figures 2(a) and 2(b). Offering the highest of those prices would
lead to a greater land allocation and thus greater biofuel sales. However, the biorefin-
ery faces a tradeoff between acquiring more biomass—hence selling more biofuel—by
offering a higher contract price and earning a higher profit margin on each unit of
biomass procured.
Biofuel price effect
Proposition 4 proved that the wholesale contract cannot coordinate the supply
chain and Proposition 6 showed that while coordination is feasible under capacity
procurement contract for certain biofuel prices, it is not an equilibrium outcome.
The results presented in Figure 3 seem to contradict those conclusions. The caveat is
those results hold as long as the fixed land resource does not constrain the integrated
system too much. With the steep rise in the integrated system’s allocation from a
small increase in the expected biofuel price α, see Figure 3(c), it is evident that when
conditions in the biofuel market look promising, the land constraint is significantly
binding. The integrated system prefers to allocate substantially more than L units
of land toward biomass production.
If the land allotment was non-binding for the integrated channel, regardless of
how profitable biofuel became, coordination would not be achieved. The integrated
system would always prefer to allocate more land toward energy crop production
than the biorefinery would be willing to induce. However, as Figures 3(a) and 3(b)
demonstrate, the biorefinery offers a significant premium to compete for the farmer’s
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(b) Capacity Procurement Price










(c) Energy Crop Allocation
Figure 3: Biofuel price effect on equilibrium contract terms and energy crop alloca-
tion in the decentralized supply chain. The dotted line depicts the farmer’s minimum
acceptable contract price; the dashed line depicts equilibrium outcomes under whole-
sale contract; the solid line depicts equilibrium outcomes under capacity procurement
contract; and, the dot-dashed line portrays outcomes in the vertically integrated sys-
tem.
land resource. The equilibrium contract price and premium are increasing in α, until
the point at which the biorefinery is able to induce the farmer’s full land resource for
biomass production. Thereafter, the equilibrium contract price is flat; the biorefinery
never finds it optimal to unnecessarily share profit by offering a contract price greater
than what is needed to induce the farmer’s total land resource.
Marginal (biomass) yield reduction rate effect
The marginal yield reduction rate δ2, is an important parameter affecting these
computational results. We adapted our crop production function from Howitt [58]
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(b) Capacity Procurement Price










(c) Energy Crop Allocation












(d) Supply Chain Profit
Figure 4: Effect of yield reduction rate (diminishing returns) on equilibrium con-
tract terms and energy crop allocation in the decentralized supply chain. The dotted
line depicts the farmer’s minimum acceptable contract price; the dashed line depicts
equilibrium outcomes under wholesale contract; the solid line depicts equilibrium
outcomes under capacity procurement contract; and, the dot-dashed line portrays
outcomes in the vertically integrated system.
who provides a number of reasons for which linear production technologies with empir-
ically unjustifiable constraints are an inappropriate tool for agricultural practitioners,
particularly policy modelers.
An alternative explanation to linear technologies with constraints is that
the profit function is nonlinear in land for most crops, and that the ob-
served crop allocations are a result of a mix of unconstrained and con-
strained optima. The most common reasons for a decreasing gross mar-
gin per acre are declining yields due to heterogeneous land quality, risk
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aversion, or increasing costs due to restricted management or machinery
capacity [58].
The nonlinear production function employed here reflects the diminishing returns to
agricultural production due to heterogeneous land quality. Note, however, that di-
minishing returns are also typically expected whenever there are capacity constraints.
Nevertheless, we evaluate the sensitivity of our model results to this nonlinear assump-
tion.
Note that as δ2 → 0 energy crop production approaches linearity so that there
are constant returns to energy crop production. The sensitivity analysis depicted
in Figure 4 shows that even when δ1 > 0 —the commodity margin per hectacre is
declining—near constant returns to energy crop production (as δ2 → 0) does not
result in a complete departure from commodity crop production, see Figure 4(c),
provided there are moderate profits in the commodity market. In this case, the (fixed)
expected biofuel price limits the biorefinery’s desire to compete for the farmer’s land
resource.
The equilibrium wholesale and capacity procurement prices are decreasing slightly
in δ2. The farmer’s minimum acceptable wholesale price is increasing slightly in δ2
while the minimum acceptable capacity procurement price is unaffected by δ2. This
explains the slight divergence in performance between the two contracts as depicted
in Figures 4(c) and 4(d).
The biorefinery pays a sizable premium under both contract structures to re-
main competitive with commodity crop production. Despite the premium, however,
biomass allocation in the decentralized supply chain pales in comparison to that in
the integrated channel. Note from Figure 4(d) that profit in the vertically integrated
channel is decreasing in δ2 at a much faster rate than in the decentralized supply
chains. This suggests that while competition has an important effect on the land




This analysis considers the economic optimal biomass land allocation—and expected
biofuel production—in a given area based on anticipated biofuel market conditions,
production costs and yield uncertainty, as well as the allocation (and production)
achieved when a profit maximizing biorefinery contracts with a profit maximizing
farmer who has alternative production options. We have considered two contract
structures, a wholesale contract in which the farmer is only paid for the biomass
actually produced, and a capacity procurement contract in which the farmer is paid
per unit land allocated to biomass production, regardless of the actual output. While
the two contracts differ substantially in structure, the difference in performance was
not substantial in the computational experiments conducted. This analysis assumed a
risk neutral farmer and biorefinery since farms in the US that produce under contract
tend to be considerably larger than those that do not [75]. Explicitly considering risk
aversion could lead to marked differences in performance between the two structures.
In general, the wholesale contract performed worse than the capacity procurement
contract in terms of land allocated toward energy crop production and total supply
chain profit. One potential explanation is the double incidence of risk experienced
under wholesale contract. Since we have not imposed explicit capacity utilization
requirements on the biorefinery, most of the production risk falls on the farmer and
is reflected in her land allocation decision. However, the biorefinery accounts for
the yield uncertainty indirectly when making his pricing decision since the realized
biomass yield effects his biofuel production level. In contrast, under capacity procure-
ment contract the farmer bears none of the production risk directly. The biorefinery
is able to share this risk though, via the offered contract price. Another explanation
is the reduced effect of commodity market competition under capacity procurement
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contract as illustrated by Corollary 2 and Proposition 6.
While the capacity procurement contract outperformed the wholesale contract,
neither was able to achieve the supply chain optimal energy crop allocation (and ex-
pected biofuel production level), except when the fixed land constraint was severely
constraining to the system. The farmer’s commodity market alternative and double
marginalization both contribute to this failure. Under wholesale contract we found
that achieving the supply chain optimal allocation is impossible provided there are
at least modest margins in the commodity market. But even when commodity mar-
gins are thin, the supply chain optimal energy crop allocation is only possible if the
biorefinery is willing to operate at zero profit. A similar result holds under capacity
procurement contract as well; except there is a certain level of revenue in the biofuel
market at which the supply chain optimal energy crop allocation is profitable for
both parties but suboptimal for the biorefinery. As mentioned previously, the inte-
grated system’s energy crop allocation represents the economic optimal production
level given biofuel market conditions. Therefore, this result suggests that in the event
that there are substantial profits in the biofuel market (e.g. due to high oil/gasoline
prices), commodity crop production may not be completely threatened by contracts
which bid away cropland.
We presented the impact of three key factors on performance: commodity price,
biofuel price, and marginal yield reduction rate. In general, the land allocated to
energy crop production is decreasing in the commodity price. However, when the
farmer expects substantial profit from commodity production, so that her reservation
profit is a binding constraint for the biorefinery, the biorefinery must sacrifice some
of its profits via higher contract prices, in order to gain farmer participation. This
reduction in double marginalization leads to a greater energy crop allocation and
system profit.
In light of commodity market competition and double marginalization, the biofuel
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price is the most important factor affecting feedstock supply; it will play an important
role in overcoming the feedstock acquisition challenge. On one hand, the biofuel
price, which is driven by the price of oil, is the biggest threat to commodity crop
production. At higher biofuel prices, the biorefinery is willing and able to offer the
farmer price premiums substantial enough to divert a significant amount of land away
from commodity production. On the other hand, however, for geopolitical reasons
it is the most difficult parameter to predict. Therefore, the biorefinery’s confidence
in the expected biofuel price, especially over long periods of time, will be essential
to establishing a viable industry for next-generation biofuels. Even more vital than
improving energy crop yields, reducing uncertainty in energy crop production, or
increasing the supply of land available for energy crop production (see the sensitivity
analysis on β2 (maximum yield), µ (expected fraction of yield realized at harvest),
and L (total land availability), in the appendix to this chapter.)
In varying the marginal yield reduction rate—which captures diminishing returns
to production due to heterogeneous land quality, risk aversion, etc.—we demonstrated
that the biorefinery’s ability to compete with the commodity market was indeed the
primary driver of model results, not the specific form of our production function.
We show that even when energy crop production is particularly favorable (δ2 → 0),
modest competition from the commodity market can temper drastic changes to the
agricultural landscape; a point that is very important in the food versus fuel debate.
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Sufficiency Conditions for Proposition 2
For general increasing and concave production functions fi(Li), KKT maximum con-











where, K1 = −f ￿￿1 (LW1 (ω)), and K2 = −f ￿￿2 (LW2 (ω)).
Condition 2 E[ΠWF (ω)] is quasiconcave in ω.
Because the biorefinery’s expected profit E[ΠWB ] is concave in ω, Kuhn–Tucker
Sufficiency conditions are satisfied as long as E[ΠWF (ω)] is concave in ω. We use L
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∂ω due to the farmer’s land constraint holding with equality at the optimal




































































































Since E[ΠWB ] is concave in ω, Arrow–Enthoven Sufficiency conditions are satisfied as
long as E[ΠWF (ω)] is quasiconcave in ω.
2.7.2 Proof of Proposition 6
For a general increasing, concave production function fi(Li) let ωICP be the price
per area which solves LCP2 (ω) = L
I
2. First-order conditions from the farmer’s land
allocation problem, assuming binding constraint, require




1(L− LI2)− c1 + c2.
The optimal biofuel production level is profitable for the biorefinery provided:
E[ΠB(ω
I
CP )] = µγ(α− k)f2(LI2)− ωICP LI2 > 0
Substituting ωICP and subtracting (c2L
I
2 + s) from both sides:
µγ(α− k)f2(LI2) >
￿
pf ￿1(L− LI2)− c1 + c2
￿
LI2 (26)










By the envelope theorem, X (the vertically integrated channel’s optimal value func-
tion) is strictly increasing in γ(α−k). Y is also increasing in γ(α−k) but is bounded
above by [pf ￿1(0)− c1]L− s. Therefore, there exists γ(α− k) such that X > Y .
Denote rCP ≡ inf{γ(α−k) : E[ΠCPB (ωICP )] > 0}. The (unconstrained) optimal biofuel






Mean Harvestable Output Effect























(b) Capacity Procurement Price










(c) Energy Crop Allocation
Figure 5: Effect of mean harvestable output on equilibrium contract terms and energy
crop allocation in the decentralized supply chain. The dotted line depicts the farmer’s
minimum acceptable contract price; the dashed line depicts equilibrium outcomes
under wholesale contract; the solid line depicts equilibrium outcomes under capacity
procurement contract; and, the dot-dashed line portrays outcomes in the vertically
integrated system.
As uncertainty in energy crop production decreases (µ increases) the premium
increases, but the effect on equilibrium contract pricing varies by contract structure.
Under wholesale contract, where the farmer bears much of the production risk, the
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equilibrium price is decreasing. However, under capacity procurement contract, where
the farmer is not directly effected by actual yields, the equilibrium price is increasing.
Under capacity procurement, the biorefinery can only take advantage of favorable
biomass yields by offering a higher price to induce greater land allocation. A similar
relationship is exhibited as the biomass yield increases, see Figure 6.
Maximum (biomass) yield effect


























(b) Capacity Procurement Price










(c) Energy Crop Allocation
Figure 6: Effect of maximum (biomass) yield on equilibrium contract terms and
energy crop allocation in the decentralized supply chain. The dotted line depicts
the farmer’s minimum acceptable contract price; the dashed line depicts equilibrium
outcomes under wholesale contract; the solid line depicts equilibrium outcomes under
capacity procurement contract; and, the dot-dashed line portrays outcomes in the
vertically integrated system.
52
Available land resource effect






















(b) Capacity Procurement Price











(c) Energy Crop Allocation
Figure 7: Effect of total land available on equilibrium contract terms and energy crop
allocation in the decentralized supply chain. The dotted line depicts the farmer’s
minimum acceptable contract price; the dashed line depicts equilibrium outcomes
under wholesale contract; the solid line depicts equilibrium outcomes under capacity
procurement contract; and, the dot-dashed line portrays outcomes in the vertically
integrated system.
The reduction in equilibrium contract prices as the farmer’s total supply of land
increases illustrates the importance of the biorefinery’s profit motives. From Figures
7(a) and 7(b) it is clear that the biorefinery can afford to pay higher contract prices
when the farmer’s land resource is larger, but he prefers not too. As a result, see
Figure 7(c), the farmer only allocates a (decreasing) fraction of the land that is





In the previous chapter we presented a model which illustrated the design of two
different contract structures with the goal of securing biomass feedstock for biofuel
production. Results from the model indicated the importance of competition for the
farmer’s land resource on equilibrium contract terms and performance in the biofuel
supply chain. This source of competition was the commodity market. Despite being
able to directly influence a farmer’s participation in energy crop production, via the
contract terms offered, moderate margins in the commodity market left the biorefinery
with an important tradeoff: offer more competitive contract terms to secure more
feedstock and produce more biofuel, or maximize the profit margin from each unit of
biomass procured.
Economic feasibility studies have been important in the analysis of biofuel and
bioenergy policy. Since next-generation biofuels are not yet available commercially,
many analyses rely on cost estimates in assessing the viability of various bioenergy
feedstocks. After accounting for the total costs of producing the feedstock, including
the opportunity cost of producing other crops or the next best use of land, these
breakeven models conclude that biomass feedstock production is viable if agricultural
producers receive prices that cover these costs. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, com-
petition for scarce land is an important driver of potential biomass supply. However,
competition is only implicitly considered in the breakeven pricing method via the
opportunity cost. Moreover, the breakeven approach implicitly assumes that when
offered a price greater than the breakeven price, the farmer should specialize in the
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production of that crop, or make it the dominant production activity. When applied
to the production of dedicated energy crops, analyses that employ breakeven pricing
also include an arbitrary limit to how much land would be used (i.e., how dominant
the crop would be) in order to reflect market uncertainties. However, contracting will
reduce the market uncertainty for farmers by making payment agreements legally
binding; thus, the manner in which farmers choose to adopt energy crop production
will have an important effect on a biorefinery’s contract pricing strategy.
The analysis conducted in Chapter 2 assumes that energy crops will be added
to a farmer’s crop mix provided it doesn’t reduce expected profitability of the entire
farm operation. Its relative importance in the crop mix depended on the biorefinery’s
contract price. In contrast, the breakeven pricing approach assumes that energy
crops will be adopted if their production is at least as profitable as commodity crop
production and implicitly assumes that it will be the dominant or specialized crop.
It is unlikely that in the near term farmers would make energy crop production a
dominant activity since the next-generation biofuel industry is marred with so much
uncertainty. However, surveys of farmers who engage in contracting of field crops
suggest there may be a time at which some farmers are willing to specialize in energy
crop production.
Among corn, soybean, and wheat operations that used contracts, over
60 percent put between 20 and 60 percent of production under contract.
Many farms, however, fell outside that range: some put all of their pro-
duction under contract, and surprisingly large numbers put either a high
share (81–100 percent of production) or a low share (1–20 percent) under
contract [76].
The assumptions made about how farmers will adopt energy crop production under
contract (i.e., incorporating it into the crop mix versus specializing) has important
implications for how contracts should be designed to secure feedstock.
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In this chapter, we compare performance in the biofuel supply chain (the biorefin-
ery’s pricing strategy, and the farmer’s corresponding land allocation/biomass supply)
when contracting with a farmer who will include energy crop production as part of a
diversified crop mix, as developed in Chapter 2, with performance in a supply chain
in which a farmer is assumed to specialize in energy crop production, as implied by
the breakeven pricing approach. A farmer who specializes in energy crop production
is assumed to maximize profit from energy crop production, provided it is at least as
profitable as commodity production. Any land not used in energy crop production
will then be put toward commodity crop production or some other use. The compar-
ison will aid in quantifying the explicit impact of commodity market conditions on
energy crop (and biofuel) production.
3.2 Literature Review
Contracting for supply in this specialized case yields results similar to those found in
the supply chain literature under contracting in buyer-driven channels. In a buyer-
driven system, buyers assert their dominance by dictating their desired mark-up over
the supplier’s stated wholesale price or by setting contract terms directly.1 We limit
the scope of this review to the literature in which buyers determine contract param-
eters as it is more directly in line with the work conducted in this analysis, as well
as what is relevant in the context of agricultural contracting. For work in the al-
ternate stream—where the supplier maintains her traditional wholesale price setting
role, albeit in response to the dominant buyer’s mark-up specification or some other
condition—see Choi [25], Ertek and Griffin [38], Lau et al. [69] and Liu and Cetinkaya
[71].
Cachon and Lariviere [22] were among the first to consider a buyer-driven channel
1The grocery channel and Walmart are common examples of buyer-driven supply chains.
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in which the buyer determines contract terms. In their study of capacity procure-
ment under both forced and voluntary compliance, as well as full and asymmetric
information with regard to demand forecasts, their analysis focuses on contract terms
which specify quantities of firm commitments and options. In the full information
case, when compliance is forced no firm commitments are made and the option and
exercise prices are chosen such that the supplier receives her minimum required profit
and the buyer extracts all excess system profit. When compliance is voluntary, the
buyer purchases neither firm commitments nor options so that the interaction is re-
duced to a wholesale (price-only) contract. Cachon and Lariviere do not determine
the equilibrium wholesale price; however, they demonstrate that it depends largely on
the variability of demand. When information is asymmetric and compliance is forced,
the buyer can credibly signal his demand forecast without cost so that, again, the
equilibrium option and exercise price leaves the supplier with her minimum required
profit and the buyer with all of the excess supply chain profit. In contrast, under
voluntary compliance, the buyer who expects high demand incurs a cost in signaling
the demand forecast because he must induce a capacity investment greater than that
under full information.
Ferguson [46] investigates contract pricing when commitments are made early or
delayed, under various leadership structures, including the dominant buyer structure.
In this two period model the buyer can commit early by submitting orders before the
supplier builds capacity, or delay commitment by submitting orders after the supplier
has built capacity. In the former, the supplier’s profit is deterministic, while in the
latter she is subject to the uncertainty in demand for the buyer’s product. When
the buyer is dominant, Ferguson finds that with early commitment the contract price
offered is just sufficient to cover the supplier’s reservation profit allowing the buyer
to extract all excess system profit. However, under delayed commitment the buyer
must induce greater capacity investment using a higher contract price so that the
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supplier’s expected profit meets her reservation level.
Ferguson’s early commitment case is analogous to the full information, forced
compliance case in [22]. When the supplier’s profit is deterministic in a buyer-driven
channel, the buyer can extract all system profit above the supplier’s minimum require-
ment. However, in our model, even with the assumption of multiplicative supply risk
which degenerates to a deterministic model under risk neutrality in which random
variables are replaced with their expected values, there are conditions under which
the buyer offers a wholesale price which affords the supplier profits in excess of her
minimal requirement. Due to diminishing returns (marginal yield reduction rate),
the wholesale price that equates the supplier’s profit to her reservation level is not
always profit maximizing for the buyer. The problem is even more pronounced when
the supplier’s capacity is limited and there is an alternative endeavor competing for
that same resource. The implication is that the supplier in our model is granted a
degree of market power by the contractual arrangement.
Wang and Gerchak [123] model the “assembler-as-leader” game in which an as-
sembler offers multiple suppliers a wholesale contract to encourage capacity installa-
tion for later production of the components needed to assemble a final good whose
demand is uncertain at the time of capacity installation. Each firm has a second
capacity source so the system is only constrained when one or more of the supplier’s
is offered a contract price lower than the cost of using the more expensive second
capacity source. In which case, the system’s capacity is constrained to the minimum
of the installed capacity of those suppliers unable to utilize the second source. The
assembler (dominant buyer) in this case uses the contract price as a strategic instru-
ment to coordinate the capacity decisions of all the component suppliers in as much as
a fixed total payment is allocated so that no supplier is incentivized to install capacity
greater than the minimum of all other installed capacities. Gerchak and Wang [49]
consider a similar assembly problem using revenue sharing contract schemes. This
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is in contrast to our model in which a dominant buyer uses contract terms to bid
capacity away from a supplier’s alternative uses for that capacity.
Capacity reservation contracts, which are common in the semiconductor industry,
are like options contracts in that the buyer pays a deductible fee up front for capacity
he would like to use in the future and the fee paid on capacity that is never used is non-
refundable [37]. This contract structure is similar in spirit to the capacity procurement
contract considered here. However, with a capacity procurement contract, the buyer
pays for capacity up front and retains the rights to the full production capability
of the reserved capacity. We are not aware of any papers which consider capacity
reservation contracts in a buyer-driven supply chain. See [125] for a review.
The aforementioned papers consider capacity acquisition; contract terms are de-
signed to induce adequate levels of capacity installation. However, integral to the
problem studied here is the supplier’s capacity allocation decision in response to con-
tract terms. The supply chain management community has typically covered the
capacity allocation problem in the context of a supplier who must allocate fixed ca-
pacity used to produce a single good among multiple retailers (buyers). Cachon and
Lariviere study various allocation mechanisms according to their impact on supply
chain performance in [20] and [21].
We consider a supplier who allocates capacity among heterogeneous products.
This distinction is important, especially when capacity is fixed and cannot be ad-
justed, because the supply chain for one product is indirectly affected by the market
for the supplier’s other products. When the supplier allocates a homogeneous prod-
uct between retailers, only the ability to get the “right” amount of product to each
retailer affects system performance. When allocating capacity across heterogeneous
products, however, whether a particular product is allocated the “right” amount of
capacity or not depends on conditions in the markets of all other products, since to-
gether they determine how the supplier will allocate capacity. In our biofuels context,
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the previous chapter illustrated the affect commodity market production had on the
supply chain for biofuel.
The operations management community has considered the capacity allocation
problem primarily in the context of production and inventory management (e.g.
[40, 50, 30]), or flexible resource investment (e.g. [47, 117, 107]). Both streams
consider capacity allocation among multiple heterogenous products with uncertain
demand. The former determines optimal production and inventory policies for each
good when total production is constrained by a shared but limited resource. The
latter considers optimal investment in expensive flexible capacity—which can pro-
duce multiple heterogenous products, unlike dedicated capacity—as a hedge against
demand uncertainty. After demand uncertainty is resolved, the flex capacity is allo-
cated toward various goods according to demand and/or profit contribution. However,
neither stream considers a buyer offering a contract in order to influence its allocation
of capacity, as we do here.
Like the production and inventory management literature we consider the allo-
cation of a fixed resource among heterogenous goods. However, our focus is on the
design of contract terms to influence this allocation. And while capacity allocation
is a recourse decision in the flexible resource literature, contrary to what is feasible
in the context of our model, the fixed capacity levels in those models are determined
endogenously.
Our work departs from the literature in several ways. Paramount is our analysis of
contract design in a buyer-driven supply chain with a capacitated, multi-product sup-
plier. Another major distinction is our departure from the standard linear production
assumption to include production with decreasing returns. We do not consider de-
mand uncertainty with respect to biofuel sales or commodity sales. Both the supplier
(farmer) and manufacturer (biorefinery) are price-takers in their respective markets,
thus, in the economic sense both operate as competitive firms in the marketplace;
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see [77] for more on competitive markets. As such, both the farmer and biorefinery
believe they can sell everything produced at the fixed market price. As in Chapter
2 we assume energy crop production is subject to an idiosyncratic risk that is inde-
pendent of the land (capacity) allocated toward production. However, without loss
of generality, we assume the yield risk is multiplicative so that under risk neutral
assumptions, the supply of biomass is adequately characterized by its expected value
at the given land allocation.
The farmer’s problem is straight forward; she allocates land in order to maximize
expected profit. Of primary interest here is the effect of competition on the farmer’s
land allocation rule and its impact on equilibrium contract terms. We study this via
the decisions made when a farmer is assumed to completely adopt production of a
contracted good provided her reservation profit is met, versus the assumption that
a farmer will add production of the contracted good to her crop mix provided she
doesn’t expect to earn a lower profit than if she did not. When land is relatively scarce
(capacity is tight), the explicit competition from commodity production that exists
with a farmer who adds the contracted crop to her crop mix confers an additional
degree of market power on the farmer, above the typical reservation profit assumption,
which significantly alters the biorefinery’s pricing decision.
3.3 Model Framework
3.3.1 Model Notation
For easy reference, we reproduce the model framework developed in Chapter 2 here.
We consider a two-echelon biofuel supply chain. Downstream is a biorefinery who
requires biomass feedstock in order to produce next-generation biofuels. Upstream is
a farmer with fixed land resource L which can be used to produce commodity crops
for sale on the spot market, energy crops for sale under contract, or both.
The farmer incurs a cost ci, i = {1, 2}—where 1 denotes the commodity crop
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and 2 denotes the energy crop—for each unit of land allocated to the production
of crop i. Before the farmer can produce energy crops, an additional fixed set up
(site preparation) cost s is incurred. Total output (supply) of crop i is an increasing,
twice-continuously differentiable, concave function of the allocated land, given by
Qi = fi(Li) ≡ (βi − δiLi)Li.2 The supply of biomass is subject to a random, positive
yield shock ￿̃ with cumulative distribution G(·), probability density function g(·),
support [￿, ￿] (0 ≤ ￿ < ￿ < ∞) and finite mean. We assume random output takes a
multiplicative form such that Q2(L2, ￿̃) ≡ f2(L2)y(￿̃). We assume y(￿) ≥ 0, y￿(￿̃) > 0;
and f2(L2) is independent of the yield distribution G(·). The expected spot price is
p.
The biorefinery expects biofuel price α and faces a constant marginal processing
cost k for each unit of biofuel produced. He procures energy crops from the farmer
at contract price ω and transforms the biomass into biofuel at the fixed input-output
ratio γ. We refer the reader to Table 1 on page 16 for the complete list of notation.
3.3.2 Integrated Supply Chain
The vertically integrated supply chain again serves as our benchmark. The integrated
channel allocates land toward energy crop production to maximize profit:
E[ΠI ] = max
0≤L2≤L
E[γ(α− k)f2(L2)y(￿̃)− c2L2 − s]
The unique optimal land use for energy crop production in the integrated system is:
LI2 = min{L￿I , L}






2We assume the farmer’s land endowment is such that marginal output is always non-negative.
In other words, f ￿i(L) ≥ 0 ∀i.
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3.3.3 Contracting with the Diversifying and Specializing Farmer
We evaluate a biorefinery’s equilibrium pricing strategy under assumptions of a diver-
sifying and specializing contractee (farmer). The model results obtained in Chapter
2 illustrate the pricing strategy when a participating farmer adds biomass feedstock
to her crop mix. When a specializing farmer chooses to participate in energy crop
production she maximizes expected profit from energy crop production alone. Any
land not used in energy crop production will then be used to produce subordinate
(commodity) crops.
Under the diversifying assumption, which we designate with the following accent
on all variables exclusive to that scenario, (̂̂·), the biorefinery’s pricing strategy de-
termines the share of biomass in the farmer’s crop mix. Therefore, the contract price
tended to include a premium, where we define premium as the difference between
the minimum contract price the farmer will accept and the biorefinery’s equilibrium
contract price. In the specializing assumption which we designate with the accent
(̂·), the biorefinery must offer a contract price which makes energy crop production
(alone) at least as profitable as commodity crop production (i.e., a price greater or
equal to the breakeven price).3
Our objective is to characterize the equilibrium contract price and resulting biomass
allocation (supply) in each scenario. In so doing, we can quantify the effect of com-
modity market competition on the biorefinery’s contract pricing strategy. Thus, again
we limit our focus to the range of market conditions in which the diversifying farmer
is constrained by her land resource and finds it optimal to make strictly positive al-
locations toward both commodity and energy crop production. Note, however, that
in this specializing scenario competition is reflected implicitly via the farmer’s reser-
vation profit constraint.
3We assume the farmer will choose to specialize in energy crop production when expected profit
from the two enterprises is equal.
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3.4 Wholesale Contract
Under the wholesale contract structure, the biorefinery offers to pay the farmer ω
for each unit of biomass produced. If the farmer accepts the biorefinery’s contract
terms (i.e., her reservation profit condition is satisfied), she will allocate L2 units of
land toward energy crop production. The biorefinery chooses the wholesale price ω to
maximize expected profit subject to gaining the farmer’s participation. Let E[ΠNCF ]
denote the farmer’s reservation profit level.
Under the specializing assumption, the biorefinery offers a contract price ω which
















E[ΠWF (L2)] ≡ E[ωf2(L2)y(￿̃)− c2L2 − s] ≥ E[ΠNCF ] (IR)
0 ≤ L2 ≤ L
(28)


















E[pf1(L− L2) + ωf2(L2)y(￿̃)− c1(L− L2)− c2L2 − s] ≥ E[ΠNCF ] (IR)
0 ≤ ￿L2 ≤ L
(29)
The incentive compatibility (IC) constraints in P̂W and ˆ̂PW (problems 28 and
29), require the farmer to choose the biomass allocation L2(ω) that maximizes her
expected profit. The individual rationality (IR) constraint ensures that contract terms
allow the farmer to receive at least her reservation profit level (in expectation). In
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the previous chapter we proved the nonlinear IR constraint in ˆ̂PW can be replaced
by a linear, lower bound constraint on the contract price. Namely, ω ≥ ωmin, where
ωmin is the minimum wholesale price for which the farmer will accept the contract
and allocate a positive quantity of land toward the production of energy crops. A
similar substitution can be made in P̂W . Let ω̂W and ˆ̂ωW be the solutions to P̂W and
ˆ̂PW , respectively.
Proposition 7. When the farmer’s IR constraint is not binding, the supply chain
with a specializing farmer i) has a lower equilibrium contract price; ii) allocates more
land toward energy crop production; and iii) achieves greater system profits relative
to the supply chain with a diversifying farmer.
Proof. i) L̂2(ω) and
ˆ̂L2(ω) denote the farmer’s land allocation response function, for a
given contract price ω, in the specializing and diversifying supply chains, respectively.
Solving the farmer’s profit maximization problem we verify that her equilibrium al-
location in each scenario satisfies:













= σ̂ ∀ω (30)




in (30) implies the biorefinery’s (unconstrained) equilibrium wholesale price is higher
in the diversifying chain than it is in the specializing chain since biomass supply is
more elastic at every contract price ω.
ii) To see that energy crop allocation is greater with a specializing farmer, we
consider the farmer’s first-order conditions (FOCs). The specializing farmer allocates
land so that f ￿2(L̂2(ω)) =
c2
µω , while the diversifying farmer allocates land toward




µω . Due to
our tight land constraint, pf ￿1(L −
ˆ̂L2(ω)) − c1 > 0; thus, f ￿2(L̂2(ω)) < f ￿2(
ˆ̂L2(ω)).
Since f2(·) is strictly increasing, L̂2(ω) > ˆ̂L2(ω) for any ω > 0. Therefore, for any
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contract offering at least the maximum of the two minimum acceptable wholesale
prices (namely, for ω ≥ max{ω̂min, ˆ̂ωmin}),4 the specializing farmer will allocate
more land than the diversifying farmer.
We have shown that for a given contract price, the specializing farmer allocates
more land toward energy crop production than the diversifying farmer. However, we
have not shown that energy crop allocation, evaluated at the equilibrium contract
price, is greater in the specializing supply chain.
Suppose not. Denote the equilibrium solutions for the specializing and diversifying
farmers, respectively, as {ω̂, L̂2(ω̂)} and { ˆ̂ω, ˆ̂L2(ˆ̂ω)}. If L̂2(ω̂) < ˆ̂L2(ˆ̂ω), then by the
discussion above, the biorefinery could induce the allocation ˆ̂L2(ˆ̂ω) from the special-
izing farmer at a contract price ω̂ + ∆ < ˆ̂ω and strictly increase his profit. Therefore,
since the biorefinery prefers {ω̂, L̂2(ω̂)} to {ω̂ + ∆, ˆ̂L2(ˆ̂ω)} in the specializing supply
chain it must be that L̂2(ω̂) >
ˆ̂L2(ˆ̂ω).
iii) To see that decentralized supply chain profit is greater with a specializing
farmer we evaluate the following inequality, where µ ≡ E[y(￿̃)]











µγ(α−k) . Again, since f2(·) is
strictly increasing on [0, L] the inequality in (31) is confirmed by (32) which implies
the decentralized system allocation is lower than that in the integrated channel.
It is not intuitive that a farmer who chooses to specialize in energy crop production
should receive a lower contract price than a farmer who prefers to dedicate only a
4Where, as before, ωmin denotes the minimum acceptable contract price, and x̂ and ˆ̂x signifies
that the parameter in question belongs, respectively, to the specializing and diversifying farmer.
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portion of her crop mix to biomass feedstock. We note, however, that the specializing
farmer requires a higher price for participation than the diversifying farmer does.
3.4.1 Sensitivity Under Wholesale Contract
The result in Proposition 7 does not provide any insight into the relative performance
of each supply chain when either or both of the systems are constrained by the farmer’s
reservation profit requirement. Using a numerical example we compare performance
as key parameters vary: α, the expected biofuel price; δ2, the marginal yield reduction
rate; p, the expected spot price; and, L the farmer’s fixed land resource. The farmer’s
reservation profit is set as the maximum profit achievable under commodity produc-
tion alone, given her available land resource. In other words, given p, β1, δ1, and c1,
reservation profit E[ΠNCF ] = pf1(L
NC
1 ) − c1LNC1 . Where LNC1 denotes the optimal
land use before any contract is offered. Under benchmark conditions we designate
L ≡ LNC1 . We calibrate our sensitivity study using the benchmark parameter values
from Chapter 2. The table has been reproduced here for easy reference.
Table 4: Benchmark Parameter Values
Parameter Benchmark Value Description Sensitivity Range
β1 8,655 kg/ha Max commodity yield per area
β2 10,000 kg/ha Max energy crop yield per area
δ1 0.1 kg/ha2 Marginal yield reduction rate (commodity)
δ2 0.05 kg/ha2 Marginal yield reduction rate (energy crop) [ 0.001, 0.3 ]
p 0.14 $/kg Commodity price [ 0.11, 0.19 ]
c1 917 $/ha Commodity production cost
c2 230 $/ha Energy crop production cost
L 10,525 ha Total available land resource [ 9,000, 19,442 ]
s 690 $ Fixed set up cost (energy crop)
µ 80 % Expected harvestable output
γ−1 9.47 kg/gal Input-output ratio (energy crop to biofuel)
α 2.7 $/gal Expected biofuel price [ 2.35, 3.50 ]
k 2.03 $/gal Marginal biofuel production cost
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(a) Equilibrium Contract Price





















Figure 8: Effect of biofuel price α on pricing strategies, equilibrium energy crop allo-
cations and biorefinery profit under contract with the specializing farmer (solid line)
and diversifying farmer (dashed line). Resource efficiency, L2(ω)/LI2, denotes the ratio
of decentralized energy crop allocation to vertically integrated energy crop allocation.
Figure 8 illustrates the difference in pricing strategy and energy crop allocation
for specializing and diversifying farmers at various expected biofuel prices, α. The
specializing farmer has a higher minimum acceptable contract price; however, at that
breakeven price it is optimal for her to use her entire land resource in energy crop
production. At low expected biofuel prices the breakeven price is constraining for
the biorefinery. But, at every expected biofuel price we obtain the result familiar to
buyer-driven channels: the biorefinery extracts all system profit above the farmer’s
reservation level. This is illustrated by the equilibrium contract price curve in the
specializing supply chain which is flat, see Figure 8(a). In contrast, when contracting
with the diversifying farmer the biorefinery must offer a premium over the farmer’s
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minimum acceptable price in order to secure a greater supply of feedstock and take
advantage of profit in the biofuel market. But, as illustrated in Figure 8(b), only
a sufficiently optimistic biofuel outlook (high α) encourages the biorefinery to offer
the premium required to induce an energy crop allocation comparable to that of the
specializing farmer.
Resource efficiency, L2(ω)/LI2, denotes the ratio of energy crop allocation in the
specialized– and diversified (decentralized) supply chains to that in the vertically inte-
grated channel, Figure 8(b). For the range of biofuel prices considered, the integrated
channel is severely constrained by the fixed land resource available for switchgrass
production. As such, there are conditions under which the decentralized systems can
attain integrated system performance levels. This occurs at a much lower contract
price in the specialized supply chain as compared with the diversified channel. In
Section 3.4.2 we relax the land constraint to evaluate performance relative to the in-
tegrated system, but from the figure it is clear that even at substantial premiums over
the breakeven price, energy crop allocation by a diversifying farmer is significantly
lower than that of the specializing farmer. Note, however, that at low biofuel prices,
when the specializing farmer’s reservation profit is an unaffordable binding constraint,
the profit maximizing biorefinery would prefer to contract with a diversifying farmer
to earn a small, but positive profit, Figure 8(c).
Figure 9 illustrates pricing strategies and energy crop allocations under vary-
ing marginal yield reduction rates δ2. Recall, the marginal yield reduction rate re-
flects diminishing returns in crop production due to heterogeneous land quality—
alternatively, risk aversion, etc. The minimum acceptable contract price is increasing
in δ2 for both types of farmers, however, its effect on equilibrium pricing differs, see
Figure 9(a). The farmer’s minimum required contract price is not a binding con-
straint with the diversifying farmer, but the specializing farmer’s required price binds
at modest levels of the variable (δ2 > 0.07). Ceteris paribus, higher δ2 makes energy
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(a) Equilibrium Contract Price























Figure 9: Effect of marginal yield reduction rate δ2 on pricing strategies, equilibrium
energy crop allocations and biorefinery profit under contract with the specializing
farmer (solid line) and diversifying farmer (dashed line). Resource efficiency, L2(ω)/LI2,
denotes the ratio of decentralized energy crop allocation to vertically integrated energy
crop allocation.
crop production less favorable, as compared with commodity crop production. How-
ever, if the specializing farmer is to adopt energy crops it has to be profitable enough
to replace commodity production, thus commanding a substantial unit price. For the
diversifying farmer, energy crop production just has to be profitable enough to enter
the crop mix, as opposed to replacing the current crop mix, so that the equilibrium
price is significantly lower yet it still offers a premium over the farmer’s minimum
requirement.
At her breakeven price, the specializing farmer finds it optimal to plant most
of her land to energy crops so that resource efficiency is substantially greater than
in the diversifying supply chain, Figure 9(b). As a result, despite earning a lower
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profit margin on each unit of biomass, the biorefinery still earns more profit with the
specializing farmer (at low and moderated levels of δ2) due to a greater volume of
biofuel sales, Figure 9(c). On the other hand, at high levels of δ2, the specializing
farmer’s minimum required price is binding and leaves little profit margin on each
unit of biomass, but average yields are also substantially lower (due to diminishing
returns) so that the biorefinery cannot make up profit via biofuel sales. Therefore,
when biomass productivity is low (δ2 is high) the biorefinery would prefer to contract
with a diversifying farmer since he could pay a lower unit price and increase his
margin on each unit of biofuel produced.













(a) Equilibrium Contract Price























Figure 10: Effect of commodity price p on pricing strategies, equilibrium energy
crop allocations and biorefinery profit under contract with the specializing farmer
(solid line) and diversifying farmer (dashed line). Resource efficiency, L2(ω)/LI2, denotes
the ratio of decentralized energy crop allocation to vertically integrated energy crop
allocation.
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A high expected commodity price makes feedstock acquisition from both types of
farmers more costly, Figure 10(a). When p >$0.145/kg the specializing farmer’s min-
imum required price constrains biorefinery profit. The diversifying farmer’s required
contract price only constrains the biorefinery at expected commodity prices greater
than $0.189/kg. Proposition 7 proved that, when neither farmer’s reservation profit
constrains the biorefinery ($0.11/kg≤ p ≤ $0.145/kg in the Figure), the diversifying
farmer commands a higher contract price. However, as illustrated in Figure 10(a), the
diversifying farmer wins a higher price even when the specializing farmer’s reservation
constraint is binding, and when she would otherwise have land left fallow (not planted
to commodities) in the absence of a biomass contract.5 This suggests the importance
of explicit competition and the benefit (additional market power) it confers on the
diversifying farmer via contract premiums (over that of reservation profit alone since
both farmers have the same reservation).
The specializing farmer earns a premium in the region where her contract price is
flat. In that region her minimum required price is not sufficient to induce full use of
her land for energy crop production, but the biorefinery finds it optimal to offer the
premium required to induce full utilization. In contrast, despite higher premiums,
the diversifying farmer does not completely abandon commodity production in this
sensitivity range, see Figure 10(b). At high expected commodity prices, competition
for a share of the crop mix is much more costly for the biorefinery than the specializing
farmer’s binding reservation profit which is evident from his expected profit, see Figure
10(c).
For farmers with a large land holding, competing with commodity production
(at its benchmark value) is not costly for the biorefinery. For smaller land holdings
(L < 10, 525 ha) the diversifying farmer requires a substantial premium to allocate
5Recall that for this numerical example we set the farmer’s total land resource equal to her
optimal commodity crop allocation under benchmark parameter values (LNC1 ).
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(a) Equilibrium Contract Price





















Figure 11: Effect of total land availability L on pricing strategies, equilibrium energy
crop allocations and biorefinery profit under contract with the specializing farmer
(solid line) and diversifying farmer (dashed line). Resource efficiency, L2(ω)/LI2, denotes
the ratio of decentralized energy crop allocation to vertically integrated energy crop
allocation.
any meaningful amount of land toward energy crop production since her land resource
is not sufficient for desired commodity production alone, see Figures 11(a) and 11(b).
At large land holdings (L > 10, 525 ha) the diversifying farmer would leave land fallow
at the expected spot price, so that the biorefinery can secure feedstock at lower prices.
The specializing farmer’s minimum required price is not binding for the biorefinery;
and, at that price she is willing to use all of her land for energy crop production.
When land is tight, the biorefinery’s biofuel price outlook discourages competi-
tion with commodity crop production for the farmer’s land when contracting with a
diversifying farmer. Competition is costly since the premiums required to compete
with commodity production result in lower profit margins on the biomass procured.
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For farmers with larger land holdings, competing with commodity production for
space in the crop mix is less costly. However, the less costly is competition, the less
the biorefinery competes. The biorefinery offers diversifying farmers with larger land
holdings a lower premium than diversifying farmers with smaller holdings, see Figure
11(a). The biorefinery takes advantage of the fact that commodity production is not
profitable on all of the farmer’s hectares. So rather than offer a higher contract price
to secure greater biomass production, the biorefinery prefers to reduce the contract
price and extract greater profits from the system indicating the biorefinery’s profit
motives (double marginalization) drive system inefficiency, not commodity market
competition, Figure 11(b).
In each of these sensitivity studies system performance with a specializing farmer
is better than performance with a diversifying farmer. Nevertheless, there are circum-
stances in which a profit maximizing biorefinery prefers the lower required contract
prices of a diversifying farmer. However, in each of these studies the vertically inte-
grated channel was constrained by the land resource over the majority of parameter
ranges considered (the exception being δ2 ≥ 0.28 in Figure 9). To evaluate perfor-
mance in each decentralized supply chain relative to performance of the vertically
integrated channel, we relax the land constraint so it no longer binds the vertically
integrated channel. The farmer’s reservation profit level does not alter her energy
crop allocation, it only dictates whether she will accept a contract or not. Therefore,
inefficiency in the system with a specializing farmer provides an estimate of double
marginalization—the extent to which profit motives prohibit the system optimal sup-
ply of biomass (biofuel). While inefficiency in the diversifying supply chain provides
an estimate for inefficiency due to the combined effects of double marginalization and
commodity market competition. We use resource efficiency (as opposed to system
efficiency as is common in the supply chain literature) to estimate effects since large
discrepancies in resource use, the variable of interest, do not necessarily reflect large
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discrepancies in supply chain profits due to diminishing returns (the marginal yield
reduction rate).
3.4.2 Inefficiency Under Wholesale Contract
We relax the land constraint so that it is no longer binding in the vertically integrated
channel and estimate the relative importance of profit and competition at various pa-
rameter values. Table 5 illustrates the relationship between contract efficiency and
the expected biofuel price α, marginal yield reduction rate δ2, and the expected spot
price p. In the supply chain with a specializing farmer there is no explicit competition
from commodity production, therefore any inefficiency is due to double marginaliza-
tion (DM). In the supply chain with a diversifying farmer inefficiency is due to the
combined effect of double marginalization and explicit competition for scarce land.
Unless otherwise specified, all parameters are at their benchmark levels except L.
Now we set L equal to the integrated channel’s unconstrained optimal energy crop
allocation at the given specified parameter values. Naturally, when the integrated
channel desires large amounts of land to maximize biofuel production there will be
little competition between commodity and energy crops. As a proxy for competition
in those instances we maintain the requirement that energy crop production be as
profitable for the farmer as commodity production.
In general, the double marginalization effect—the inefficiency resulting from DM—
is low at higher expected biofuel prices, higher marginal yield reduction rates and
higher expected commodity prices. Whereas the combined effect—inefficiency due
to both DM and commodity market competition—is low at higher biofuel prices,
higher marginal yield reduction rates but lower commodity prices. At higher biofuel
prices, the biorefinery is willing and able to offer higher contract prices in order to
induce a greater allocation thereby reducing the double marginalization effect. Higher
prices make competition affordable, thus reducing the combined effect. The apparent
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Table 5: Double Marginalization (DM) vs Combined Effect: Inefficiency in the Supply














increase in double marginalization from α = $2.55/gal to α = $2.75/gal, is due to a
binding IR constraint. When the expected biofuel price is low, the biorefinery prefers
to offer a lower wholesale price, but must satisfy the farmer’s participation constraint.
At higher expected biofuel prices the biorefinery is free to offer the wholesale price
which maximizes his profit, thus the increase in DM from a biofuel price at which the
supplier’s minimum required wholesale price is a binding constraint to a biofuel price
at which it does not bind.
At high yield reduction rates DM is low as both land use in the integrated channel
is relatively low and the farmer’s minimum required wholesale price is high. Although
yields are declining, the minimum required wholesale price is sufficient to warrant
substantial land use by the specializing farmer. The combined effect is lower primarily
due to the reduction in double marginalization; the competition effect, however, is
quite substantial even as double marginalization is nearly eliminated at very high
yield reduction rates (e.g. δ2 = 0.25).
At high expected spot prices the farmer’s reservation profit is high and the biore-
finery must sacrifice its own profit to gain contract acceptance, thus low DM at high
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expected commodity prices. However, in the supply chain with a diversifying farmer,
a high spot price increases both the supplier’s reservation profit and direct competitive
effects. That the combined effect is high despite low DM suggests that competition
has a bigger effect on system performance than profit motives.
Perakis and Roels [88] find that inefficiency due to double marginalization in a
two-stage decentralized supply chain operating under price-only (wholesale) contract
is at least 42%. Though their modeling assumptions are very different from ours,
including a zero reservation profit assumption, most of our DM estimates are similar.
Interestingly, they find that when there are multiple, identical retailers (buyers), each
of which proposes a wholesale contract to a single supplier, competition between the
retailers increases the inefficiency due to double marginalization. In our case, in which
there is indirect competition between a contract proposing retailer (biorefinery) and a
distinct, exogenous spot market, competition decreases the inefficiency due to double
marginalization.
What is especially interesting about the results in Table 5 is the magnitude of
difference between the DM and combined effects. It is clear that even when compet-
ing against a commodity market with thin margins feedstock acquisition will be a
challenge. And while marginal (less productive) land is attractive since commodity
competition is virtually eliminated, low biomass yields on marginal land may make
acquisition as costly, albeit without the potentially adverse impact on the food sys-
tem.
3.5 Capacity Procurement Contract
Under the capacity procurement contract the biorefinery pays per unit area—for each
of the L2 units dedicated toward energy crop production—as opposed to per unit
biomass actually produced. If the farmer accepts the biorefinery’s contract terms she
will dedicate the agreed upon L2 units of land toward energy crop production. The
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biorefinery chooses the capacity procurement price ω to maximize his expected profit
subject to the farmer accepting the contract.

















E[ΠNCF ] + s
ω − c2
(IR)
0 ≤ L2 ≤ L
(33)



















pf1(L− L2) + (ω − c2)L2 − c1(L− L2)− s ≥ E[ΠNCF ] (IR)
0 ≤ L2 ≤ L
(34)
In the specializing supply chain, the biorefinery can always extract all system profit
above the farmer’s reservation level with a capacity procurement contract. Since the
farmer is assumed to accept any contract that provides her minimum requirement,
the capacity procurement price must satisfy (ω − c2)L2 − s ≥ E[ΠNCF ] (see the IR
constraint in problem 33). As a result, the biorefinery’s pricing decision is a nonlinear
function of the farmer’s land resource, taking the form of a quantity discount pricing
scheme. For greater land allocation, the biorefinery can offer a lower per unit (area)
price as total procurement will be sufficient to satisfy the farmer’s IR constraint.
However, if fewer hectares are desired, the per unit (area) price must be higher in
order to satisfy the minimum profit requirement.6
6Tomlin [106] also demonstrates that in a supply chain in which both the supplier and biorefinery
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Proposition 8. When contracting with a specializing farmer it is always optimal to
induce the integrated system’s energy crop allocation, LI2.
Proof. Let ω(L̂2) denote the inverse land allocation function: it is the minimum
contract price the biorefinery can offer for L2 units of land that will be accepted by
the specializing farmer, ω(L̂2) =
E[ΠNCF ]+s+c2L̂2
L̂2
. Then, the biorefinery’s objective is




µγ(α− k)f2(L̂2)− ω(L̂2)L̂2 (35)
It is easy to verify that second-order sufficient conditions for concavity of the biore-
finery’s expected profit function are satisfied. The biorefinery’s objective function is
well behaved and first–order conditions are necessary and sufficient in determining
the optimal capacity level.
µγ(α− k)f ￿2(L̂2) −
￿
ω(L̂2) + L̂2 · ω￿(L̂2)
￿
= 0 (36)
The biorefinery’s first-order condition, equation (36), reduces to f ￿2(L̂2) =
c2
µγ(α−k) , the
same condition which characterizes the integrated channel’s equilibrium allocation.
In the supply chain with diversifying farmer, ω( ˆ̂L2) = pf ￿1(L−
ˆ̂L2)−c1 +c2. Given
commodity market conditions, the capacity procurement price is a linear function of
the desired land allocation. In the previous chapter we showed that under certain
conditions, the integrated system’s allocation is feasible (both the farmer and biore-
finery earn positive profits); however, it is not an equilibrium outcome. The result
indicates a degree of flexibility offered by the capacity procurement contract that is
not admitted by the wholesale contract. When the biofuel price is sufficiently high,
the biorefinery can achieve the integrated system’s performance without sacrificing
must build capacity, there exist quantity discount contracts that can coordinate the supply chain
which leave the supplier with her reservation profit.
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too much profit. But because the biorefinery can extract all system profits above the
farmer’s reservation level when contracting with a specializing farmer, the biorefinery
is guaranteed system optimal performance without having to sacrifice any profit.
3.5.1 Capacity Procurement Efficiency
As shown in Proposition 8 there is no double marginalization effect in the supply
chain with a specializing farmer under capacity procurement contract. Because the
biorefinery, who acts as Stackelberg leader, absorbs the diminishing returns to biomass
production, the interaction between the farmer and biorefinery is reduced to a scenario
similar to the full information, forced compliance scenarios in [22] and [46]. Though
no inefficiency is present in the specializing farmer chain, we compare equilibrium
contract prices in both decentralized supply chains and evaluate efficiency in the
supply chain with diversifying farmer at varying parameter values. As before, the
notation x̂ and ˆ̂x signifies the parameter in question belongs, respectively, to the
specializing and diversifying farmer.
Table 6 presents the equilibrium capacity procurement price in the supply chain
with specializing farmer (ω̂), the diversifying farmer’s minimum acceptable procure-
ment price (ˆ̂ωmin), the equilibrium procurement price for the diversifying farmer (ˆ̂ω),
and resource efficiency in the supply chain with diversifying farmer (
ˆ̂L2(ˆ̂ω)/LI2). The
bold row depicts performance under benchmark conditions.
As with the wholesale contract, at higher expected biofuel prices α, the resource
efficiency of a capacity procurement contract with diversifying farmer is higher. The
equilibrium contract price for the specializing farmer is constant in α since the system
is constrained by the farmer’s available land (L̂2 = LI2 = L). The price for the
diversifying farmer is increasing in α, reflecting the biorefinery’s willingness and ability
to compete with commodity production.
At high yield reduction rates δ2, the diversifying farmer’s equilibrium procurement
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2.55 377.42 236.22 327.03 32.92%
2.75 377.42 236.22 400.59 57.89%
α
3.15 377.42 236.22 524.70 100%
0.01 377.42 236.22 394.67 55.88%
0.03 377.42 236.22 388.39 53.75%
0.15 377.42 236.22 358.91 43.74%
δ2
0.3 386.82 236.22 334.58 37.75%
0.12 259.33 230.13 307.87 82.69%
0.14 377.42 236.22 382.58 51.77%
p
0.16 529.46 367.65 455.17 27.96%
9,000 398.77 278.92 405.89 52.85%
15,000 333.44 230.15 314.18 49.88%
L
20,000 307.57 230.07 237.75 48.76%
price is lower, as is resource efficiency. At high yield reduction rates average yields
are low; therefore, the biorefinery desires less capacity—this is best exemplified by
δ2 = 0.3 in the table, at which point the farmer’s land availability does not constrain
the system. But in order to satisfy the specializing farmer’s participation requirement
it must offer a higher capacity procurement price. Since the farmer is immune to
any production risks under capacity procurement contract, the only way to secure
a greater share of the diversifying farmer’s crop mix (for low δ2) is through higher
contract prices.
When the expected spot price p is high the specializing farmer’s reservation profit
(and thus minimum required procurement price) is high. The reservation profit and
commodity crop competition in the diversifying farmer supply chain are higher at
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higher expected spot prices as well. However, since the specializing farmer requires
energy crop production alone to be as profitable as commodity crop production,
the specializing farmer requires a substantially larger capacity procurement price to
produce biomass when commodities are especially profitable (p = 0.16 in the Table
6).
The competition for land wins the diversifying farmer a substantial premium.
When the available land resource is constraining, even in the absence of energy crop
production (e.g. L = 9, 000 in Table 6), the diversifying farmer requires a substantial
premium in order to participate at the biorefinery’s desired level. Recall from the
previous chapter that under capacity procurement contract the farmer’s commodity
allocation is independent of L. So offering a high procurement price is the only way
to secure a substantial supply of biomass. In contrast, a quantity discount structure
emerges in the specializing supply chain, as is readily apparent from the relationship
between ω̂ and L in the table. At greater land holdings (e.g. L = 20, 000) however,
the biorefinery can secure land from the diversifying farmer if she is offered a capacity
procurement price that is a small markup above the total cost of production since
the land would otherwise be left fallow.
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we compare the design of two contract structures, wholesale (price-
only) and capacity procurement, for two types of contract adopting farmers, the
diversifying farmer who adds a contracted crop to her crop mix and a specializing
farmer who will make the contracted crop her dominant output. There is much to
be learned about contracting in agriculture; not least of these, the reasons producers
and buyers choose to enter into contracts. Many producers cite reduced price/income
and yield risks as a reason for contracting. Farmers who are particularly risk averse
may sacrifice income in order to reduce or eliminate their exposure to risk. But as
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noted in [75], contracts are not the only income risk reducing tools (e.g., hedging,
insurance) and risk reduction does not explain the premiums earned by some farmers
over average marketing year spot prices for the same commodity. Our analysis shows
that the reasons a farmer chooses to produce under contract, and hence the type of
farmer she would be, greatly influences the contract terms a biorefinery would use
to secure his desired feedstock production and the resulting profitability (viability)
of a biofuel industry. The specializing farmer we have considered would tend to
be very sensitive to price fluctuations and prefer the guaranteed prices associated
with contract production to the uncertainty of spot market production. Whereas the
diversifying farmer might be interested in producing a differentiated crop for which
transaction costs in the spot market are too high, or contracting as part of an overall
risk reducing strategy.
An important source of risk that is integral to this particular problem is the yield
uncertainty with respect to energy crop production. Under the capacity procurement
contract structure this risk does not effect the farmer, however, under the wholesale
structure it would be an important determinant of a farmer’s willingness to accept a
contract. Since this particular risk we are interested in is so idiosyncratic, attempting
to characterize it by anything other than some expected belief about its value would
be unjustifiable. However, as the research on best management practices as well as
site and variety specific average yields continues to be published and disseminated,
this particular risk will be reduced.
Using biomass contracts for biofuel production as an application, we find that
when designing a wholesale contract for a specializing farmer, the equilibrium whole-
sale price tends to be lower than what would be offered a diversifying farmer, yet a
greater land allocation can be expected. Similarly, we find that when offering a capac-
ity procurement contract to a specializing farmer, a quantity discount price structure
emerges and supply chain coordination is expected.
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In order to understand the impact of competition from the commodity market
on contract terms and supply chain performance, we relaxed the land constraint
for the integrated channel and estimated the double marginalization and combined
effects—inefficiency in the specializing– and diversifying supplier chains, respectively.
Inefficiency results for the wholesale and capacity procurement contract structures are
quite different. Under wholesale contract, the marginal yield reduction rate directly
effects the farmer. Consequently, the relative profit and production efficiency of com-
modity crops plays a significant role in the diversifying farmer’s energy crop allocation
decision, even when the biorefinery is willing to pay a premium for biomass. In con-
trast, the capacity procurement contract transfers production risk to the biorefinery
since he pays per unit land as opposed to per unit biomass under this contract struc-
ture. As a result, the commodity market has little effect on system performance when
land is available in abundance, and inefficiency arises primarily from the biorefinery’s
profit motive.
In the supply chain literature, an agent’s alternatives are typically reflected in
their reservation profit. However, in a context like agriculture in which production
diseconomies exist (due to varying soil quality, increased risks of pests, etc.) and there
tends to be a preference for diversification in production, it will be important to design
contracts with explicit account of these characteristics, especially since agricultural
land is fixed in all but possibly the long-term. Considering reservation profit alone
(breakeven pricing) is not likely to be useful in securing biomass feedstock in the
near term; and as illustrated by the diversifying farmer, competing for space in a
farmer’s crop mix can be quite costly. In the context of a nascent industry like next-
generation biofuels where supplier participation is essential to market success but
alternative production options for the supplier abound, the results obtained in this
study highlight the important tradeoff between earning profit and securing feedstock.
84
CHAPTER IV
BIOMASS FEEDSTOCK CONTRACTS: ROLE OF LAND
QUALITY AND YIELD VARIABILITY IN NEAR TERM
FEASIBILITY
4.1 Introduction
In recent years there have been many studies which estimate potential biomass feed-
stock availability in the United States and the resultant impacts on agriculture and
the environment. Several models in particular, fapri, fasom, gtap, and polysys,
have been used extensively to evaluate the impacts of bioenergy policy on the agricul-
tural and energy sectors, as well as the national economy. These partial and general
equilibrium models evaluate deviations from baseline projections of the agricultural
sector, over several decades, as the system adjusts to meet various policy goals or
responds to various system shocks.
These models are useful in evaluating potential long-term, cross-sectoral effects
of policy. However, these models are only as good as their baseline projections and
their assumptions about the state of the world over the course of multiple decades.
In this chapter we extend the modeling framework developed in Chapter 2 to esti-
mate potential feedstock availability and cropland conversion over a five year period,
with particular emphasis on the importance of payment structure, feedstock yield
variability, and commercial scalability of feedstock production.
As a case study, we apply our model to switchgrass production in Tennessee.
Switchgrass is a bioenergy feedstock native to North America; it was deemed a model
bioenergy crop by the Biofuels Feedstock Development Program (BFDP) [80, 27].
Due to higher switchgrass yields and lower land rents (relative to yield potential),
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the U.S. Appalachia1 region is expected to be an important source for the cellulosic
biomass required to meet national renewable energy goals. A pilot-scale plant for
producing ethanol from switchgrass is currently operating in Vonore, Tennessee [27];
the University of Tennessee has long been a part of the BFDP research program, and
the program itself was initiated at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee [80].
Thus, the state is a relevant location for this study.
Tennessee is not a dominant player (in terms of rank among U.S. states) when it
comes to the supply of most major field crops. In 2010, the state ranked 27th in the
value of field and miscellaneous crop production and 29th in the total value of principal
crops (which also includes fruits, nuts and commercial vegetables) [115]. In terms of
the value of cropland in Tennessee, among the five states in the Appalachia region,
average cropland value in Tennessee ranks fourth. Among the ten U.S. economic
regions, average cropland value in Appalachia ranks fifth [113]. See Figures 24 and
25 in the appendix for a geospatial map of the value of crops produced in the US and
Tennessee, respectively.
According to the 2007 Census of Agriculture, by commodity group, the value of
grains, oilseeds, dry beans and dry peas produced in Tennessee ranked 26th in the
nation, the value of cotton and cottonseed ranked 10th out of the 17 states which
produce cotton, and the value of hay and other crops ranked 41st in the nation. With
respect to the market value of hay and field crops (cotton, grains and oilseeds), Ten-
nessee ranked in the bottom half when compared to the rest of the nation. However,
the state ranked in the top half with respect to acres devoted toward crop produc-
tion. Among the 17 cotton producing states, Tennessee ranked 6th in terms of acres
planted, 24th in land planted to wheat, 19th in land planted to corn, 17th in land
planted to soybeans and 12th in land used for hay and other forage [112].
1The Appalachia region consists of Kentucky, North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia and West
Virginia.
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Near-term challenges to meeting next-generation biofuel goals—which include
costly feedstocks and encouraging farmer participation—make Tennessee an inter-
esting case study. The combination of high bioenergy feedstock yields and relatively
low value to traditional agricultural production could make the state a candidate for
regional concentration of bioenergy feedstock supply.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: in Section 4.2 we briefly in-
troduce and discuss several models which have been used to estimate feedstock supply
and the resultant impacts on agriculture and the environment; Section 4.3 describes
the data sources and methodology used in developing switchgrass supply curves as
well as crop displacement curves for Tennessee; Section 4.4 presents the supply curves
and discusses them in the context of previous modeling efforts; concluding remarks
are presented in Section 4.5.
4.2 Literature Review
Perlack et al. [89] produced one of the first studies estimating the potential supply of
biomass feedstock for bioenergy production. This study considered supply based on
technical feasibility. Since then, many studies have been conducted to estimate sup-
ply based on economic feasibility. Four economic models, fapri, fasom, gtap, and
polysys, have been particularly influential in both informing and evaluating agricul-
tural and energy policy as it relates to the economic costs of large-scale production
of biofuels and its resultant impact on the agricultural landscape.
The Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (fapri) model was devel-
oped by the joint research program between the Center for Agricultural and Rural
Development (card) at Iowa State University and the Center for National Food and
Agricultural Policy (cnfap) at the University of Missouri. The fapri model is a par-
tial equilibrium model which uses extensive data from the world agricultural market
to develop baseline projections of the U.S. agricultural sector as well as international
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commodity markets [42]. The fapri/card International Ethanol Market Model ex-
tends the fapri model to include projections of “the production, use, stocks, prices,
and trade for ethanol for several countries and regions of the world” [43]. Studies em-
ploying the model to evaluate bioenergy production include [41], which considers the
global impact of local land allocation decisions in response to expanding ethanol pro-
duction; and [56], which considers biofuel expansion under four policy/energy price
scenarios and the resultant impact on agricultural commodities.
The Forest and Agricultural Sector Optimization Model (fasom), developed by
Bruce McCarl and his team at Texas A&M University, is a partial equilibrium model
which simulates land allocation responses to policy in the forest and agricultural
sectors. Simulation results depict the land allocation in each period which maximizes
the net present value of total welfare—the sum of consumer and producer surplus
[13]. With respect to biofuel production, the model has been used to assess market
impacts of changes in demand for biomass feedstocks as well as the impact of meeting
the renewable fuel targets set forth in the Energy Independence and Security Act of
2007 [13].
The Policy Analysis System (polysys) is also a partial equilibrium model which
has been used frequently to assess the impacts of biofuel production on agriculture
and the environment. In fact, the technical feasibility report by Perlack et al. [89]
was updated by Downing et al. [32] to consider economic potential using the polysys
model. The national simulation model analyzes deviations from a baseline projection
of the U.S. agricultural sector in response to changes in policy as well as changes in
economic or environmental conditions [28]. polysys is composed of modules linking
national supply, demand and prices for crops and livestock with national income. Ad-
ditional modules, such as the energy crop module, have been developed to increase the
scope of analysis. polysys has been adapted to estimate potential biomass feedstock
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supply under various feedstock demand and price scenarios. After setting an exoge-
nously determined price and level of demand for biomass feedstocks, a linear program
is enacted for each of the models 305 regions—based on Agricultural Statistics Dis-
tricts (ASDs)—to determine the land allocated to competing crops which maximizes
the expected net present value of returns, subject to various constraints [28]. The
group of researchers affiliated with the University of Tennessee’s Agricultural Policy
Analysis Center, where polysys was developed, have used the model to produce
a number of reports on the economic impacts of biofuels and the implications for
agricultural land use. These studies can be found in [29, 31, 120, 121], among others.
The Global Trade Analysis Project (gtap) is a global network of researchers and
policy makers, a database, and a computable general equilibrium modeling frame-
work. With its heavy focus on international trade, the general equilibrium model has
been adapted and used extensively to study a number of economic and policy issues
with global implications. The energy and environmental version of the model, along
with land use, biofuel and greenhouse gas emission extensions to the gtap database,
have permitted a number of applications with particular focus on the global impli-
cations of biofuels. Applications to research on energy and the environment abound
[51]; the gtap Working Paper Series maintains a collection of research reports in
progress which employ the gtap model [52].
For a review of studies which integrate bioenergy systems into partial and general
equilibrium models see Kretschmer and Peterson [65], Gerber et al. [48], and Birur et
al. [14]. For a comprehensive review of the impacts of biofuels found in studies from
the policy, environmental and economic literature, see Rajagopal and Zilberman [93].
These equilibrium models are particularly well suited to illustrate the linkages
between economic sectors and the mechanisms through which decisions in one sector
impact state variables and decisions in other sectors. However, as these models were
developed to provide insight into the long-term implications of various policies or
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shocks to the system, they are limited in their ability to address many of the challenges
impeding near term adoption of next-generation biofuels. For example, the models
project changes in the agricultural landscape and commodity prices over long periods
when the system is forced to meet target production levels. Yet, as is evident from the
drastic reduction in 2011 mandated levels of cellulosic biofuel production from 250
million gallons to 6.6 million gallons, supply does not just appear in the appropriate
quantities because a policy is put in place [119]. Thus, studies regarding how biofuel
mandates will be met require greater resolution. Taking a narrower approach to
the question of where biomass feedstock and biofuels will be produced—especially as
it pertains to the near term challenges of getting the industry off the ground—and
building on those results, may provide a better perspective on how policies can be
achieved and the subsequent effect on the agricultural landscape.
Rajagopal et al. [92] note the increased complexity in a farmer’s decision to adopt
a new bioenergy crop. The adoption of next-generation biofuel technologies will
require new markets and institutions. The risks involved create a “chicken-and-egg”
problem of sorts. Farmers won’t adopt these new crops unless they are guaranteed a
market for their sale (via contracts) and returns at least as great as alternative uses
for the land. Similarly, biorefineries will not come on board unless they can guarantee
affordable year round feedstock supply, not to mention a market for their output, the
necessary infrastructure to transport biofuels and policies which support the industry.
Alexander et al. [6] discuss the challenges of contracting for perennial crops using
principles from modern contract theory as a backdrop.
In the near and medium-term, before spot markets exist for the supply and pur-
chase of cellulosic bioenergy feedstocks, the construction of biorefineries will drive the
location of feedstock production and the prices at which feedstock will be available
for purchase. Therefore, long-term projections of cellulosic feedstock supply should
be done in tandem with biorefinery siting. Local projections of feedstock supply will
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aid the facility siting problem which will, in turn, facilitate better projections at the
national and international scales.
The contributions of this chapter are to that effect. In focusing on the decision
to adopt cellulosic feedstock at the county level, and paying particular attention to
the importance of payment structure, variability in feedstock yields and assumptions
on the commercial scalability of feedstock production, we hope to provide a refined
approach to the estimation of feedstock supply and impacts on the agricultural land-
scape which will aid in the decision of where to locate facilities for biofuel production.
The aforementioned equilibrium models are not the only models which consider the
economic competitiveness of bioenergy feedstocks and traditional commodity crops.
A committee recently convened by the National Research Council used the Biofuel
Breakeven model (BioBreak) to assess the feasibility of local or regional markets for
cellulosic biomass [85]. Taking into account the full cost of producing and delivering
biomass feedstock, as well as the potential revenue and full costs of producing biofuels
from cellulosic feedstocks, the model calculates a biorefinery’s “willingness to pay”
for feedstock as well as an agricultural producer’s “willingness to accept.” Willingness
to pay is the maximum price a biorefinery could pay for delivered biomass feedstock,
without incurring losses. Willingness to accept is the minimum price an agricultural
producer would accept for biomass; it is the price at which all costs are recouped.
The model provides an excellent account of the costs associated with biofuel pro-
duction; it is one of the few models which estimates feedstock costs including both
transportation and storage costs.2 However, breakeven models provide no insight into
how agricultural producers decide to allocate land among competing endeavors. A
method for determining how much land will be allocated to biomass feedstocks at
various prices is essential in estimating the potential supply availability.
Khanna et al. employ the Biofuel and Environmental Policy Analysis Model
2Most studies only consider farm gate prices.
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(bepam), an equilibrium model, in their study of the regional production of cellulosic
feedstock. The model determines an economically viable mix of cellulosic feedstocks
using a rolling horizon approach with 10-year planning period [64]. The model keeps
the price of biomass constant over a period longer than two decades; yields of peren-
nial grasses, like switchgrass, do not vary by soil or land quality (marginal land is
assumed to produce the same yields as productive cropland); and the model imposes
an arbitrary cap (25%) on the amount of land that can be converted to perennial
grasses “due to concerns about the impact of monocultures” [64]. The model also
uses historical crop mixes with small allowances (10%) for the production of new
crops, to limit the cropland available for conversion to feedstock production [24].
Key assumptions highlighted above could have important implications for the ac-
tual willingness to produce biomass feedstock and the supplies available from land
allocated toward feedstock production. For example, it has been reported that yields
of cellulosic feedstocks like switchgrass vary according to soil quality and field land-
scape (e.g. sloping versus level land) [27, 33, 80, 83]. However, the size of decision
making entities precludes analyses with a sufficient spatial distribution of feedstock
yields. bepam does not vary feedstock yields by land category (e.g. cropland, idled
land, pastureland), let alone classifications within categories. And because allocation
decisions are made at the Crop Reporting District (crd) level, yields will only vary
by blocks of counties at best.3 From the perspective of a biorefinery, estimates of
potential feedstock availability will have to take into account yield variability at a
smaller scale.
Due to the challenges of transporting cellulosic feedstock, it is likely that trade
will be restricted to specific geographic regions [85]. It may be the case that a major
3The crd is analogous to the Agricultural Statistics District (ASD) unit used by polysys. In
fasom, land allocation decisions are made at either a 63 agricultural subregion scale or an 11
market region scale. fapri’s U.S. model contains nine agricultural regions, and in gtap the globe
is apportioned into 18 agroecological zones.
92
transformation of the agricultural landscape takes place in one region of the country,
rather than small transformations in all regions. Limiting the scale of adoption using
historical crop mixes with small allowances for new energy crops, or arbitrarily impos-
ing limits on the amount of cropland which could be converted, prevents study of the
feasibility of such geographic concentration and its impact on the agricultural land-
scape. Therefore, in our case study we impose no limits on the amount of land that
can be converted to switchgrass production. Our analysis provides insight into the
conditions under which an “energy plantation”4 might be formed and the resulting
agricultural landscape.
Projections in these studies rely on energy crop yields obtained in field trials
or through simulation models. However, not much is known about growing energy
crops on a scale large enough to support a commercial biofuel industry [85]. It is
not clear whether the yields attainable in small field trials—under ideal management
practices and controlled conditions—will translate when production is at a much
larger scale. And, as noted in [64, 85], increased cultivation could make energy
crops more susceptible to pests and disease. Because we use a nonlinear production
function, as opposed to the linear (Leontief) production functions used by bepam
and other models, we can incorporate the effects of monoculture, or the inability of
feedstock production to scale commercially, into the land allocation decision without
imposing arbitrary constraints.
Parker et al. [86] develop a biofuel supply curve for the Western United States
using the National Biorefinery Siting Model (nbsm), a model that combines mixed-
integer linear optimization with a geographic information system (gis). Designed to
optimize the entire biofuel supply chain, the model:
consider[s] explicit spatial distributions of biomass supply, competition
4This term has been adapted from Rajagopal et al. [92].
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among technologies for resources, and the economies of scale of conver-
sion technologies in finding the best design for biofuel supply chains. The
model locates, sizes, and allocates feedstock to biorefineries with the ob-
jective of maximizing the profitability of the industry as a whole [86].
The optimal location and size of a biorefinery will depend largely on the potential
supply of feedstock. However, nbsm uses production statistics and fapri projections
to determine the potential supply of energy and commodity crops. And, it assumes
energy crops will be grown on marginal land only. Because the model’s emphasis is
on facility siting, it takes the variety and supply of feedstocks as given.
Graham et al. [54] also employ gis modeling in their estimation of the costs of
energy crops. Their goal is similar to ours in that they seek to evaluate the cost
and supply of bioenergy feedstocks taking into account regional geographic variation.
They also use Tennessee, and ten other states, as a test case. Nevertheless, their
approach to estimating the land that will be converted to feedstock production, and
thus the supply of feedstock, differs from the approach we employ here. They assume
land is converted to feedstock production if the farm gate price is such that the
net present value of producing feedstock is equivalent to what can be earned if the
current mix of crops was maintained over the lifespan of the energy crop. The amount
of land that would be converted is restricted to the amount of land dedicated to the
dominant crop in their area in an optimistic scenario, or to the amount of land
dedicated to minor crops in a pessimistic scenario. Their farm gate price is analogous
to the minimum acceptable contract price in our model; however, the amount of land
converted for feedstock production in our model is the optimal allocation between
the current mix of commodity crops and feedstock production. Also, because the
model uses annualized yields for energy crops in determining the price at which land
is converted, it does not take into account the significance of the time value of money
in prematurity years when yields are low but maintenance costs are still incurred.
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Our approach focuses on the importance of yield variability, commercial scalability,
and payment structure in estimating the potential supply of energy crops and in
assessing their impact on the agricultural landscape via the crops they displace. By
considering land allocation at the county level, our results and analysis are useful
in deciding where to locate biorefineries. And, by not imposing arbitrary limits on
the amount of land that can be converted to switchgrass production, we consider the
cost and agricultural landscape associated with regional concentration of energy crop
production.
4.3 Data and Methods
In estimating potential switchgrass production and crop displacement in the state of
Tennessee, we modify the model developed in Chapter 2 to include multiple periods
and the opportunity cost of land. The farmer faced with the option of growing
switchgrass under contract for T years will accept the offer if the contract price is
such that expected profit under the optimal allocation of land between commodity
and energy crop production is at least as great as expected profit over the T -year
period from commodity crop production alone. Expected profits must also be greater
than what is expected from the next best use of the farmer’s land (opportunity cost).5
4.3.0.1 Wholesale Contract
Under wholesale contract, each farmer allocates land toward commodity crop pro-
duction (L1), switchgrass production (L2), and the next the best opportunity (L3) in
order to maximize the expected net present value of profits over the T -year period,
5Keeping with the convention in the agricultural literature, we use the cash rental rate to reflect
the opportunity cost of land.
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Where, pt+1 is the expected spot price in year t + 1; gy is the expected annual
growth in commodity yields; gc is the expected annual growth rate of variable costs;
c1 is the variable (per unit land) cost of growing commodities at t = 0, yM,t+1 is the
switchgrass yield in year t + 1 represented as a fraction of the yield at maturity (we
assume stands reach maturity in year 3); c2t is the variable (per unit land) production
cost for switchgrass in year t;6 ω is the contract price (dollars per unit biomass); cR is
the cash rental rate; and r is the real discount rate. We assume all costs are incurred
at the beginning of the year while payments are received at the end of the year.7
4.3.0.2 Capacity Procurement Contract
Under capacity procurement contract, each farmer allocates land toward the compet-


































As with the wholesale contract, we assume all revenues are earned at the end of the
year while costs are incurred at the beginning. Here, the contract price ω has unit
dollars per (land) area.
6c2,0 represents establishment costs per unit land, c2t, for t > 0 are annual maintenance and
harvest costs.
7For crops that are harvested more than once a year, costs have been annualized.
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4.3.0.3 Minimum Expected Profit Under Contract
The farmer will only accept a contract (wholesale or capacity procurement) if the
price is such that expected profit under contract is at least as great as expected profit
from commodity production and/or the next best alternative over the T -year horizon.
In other words, expected profit under contract must be greater or equal to:












s.t. L1 + L3 = L (39)
4.3.1 Data
To calibrate the model, we make use of the following sources for data and parameter
estimates: USDA National Agricultural Statistical Service (NASS) [114], field crop
budgets created by the University of Tennessee [79], and a study on switchgrass
production in Tennessee by Mooney et al. (2009) [83]. From NASS we obtained the
following data for major grains and field crops produced in Tennessee: land planted,
land harvested, yield, and total production. The data are available annually for
each county in the state. Crop budgets are produced annually by the University
of Tennessee as a short-term (annual or less) planning tool. For select crops (corn,
cotton, soybeans, wheat and hay) and farming practices (e.g. conventional tillage, no
tillage), crop budgets provide per acre estimates of the variable and fixed costs of field
operations required to achieve a given crop yield. Budgets also contain an estimated
market price for each crop. Mooney et al. analyze data from a three year experiment
of switchgrass production on lands of varying quality/suitability [83]. The paper
contains production budgets similar to the crop budgets produced by the University
of Tennessee as well as five- and ten year projections of switchgrass yields based on
the experiments.
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4.3.1.1 Calibrating the Model
Our model is calibrated at the crop-county level; this is the lowest level of aggregation
for which data are available. The data are presented such that crop production is
completely separable. Therefore, we assume that in each county, a crop is produced
by a single enterprise. In other words, we assume a single farmer produces all of
the, say, corn in a given county, and no other crops.8 Parameters of the production
function are estimated from the yields reported in NASS for commodity (food) crops
and those reported in Mooney et al. for switchgrass. Production costs and expected
prices for commodity crops were obtained from the crop budgets, while switchgrass
production costs were obtained from [83]. Following Mooney et al., a real discount
rate of 5.4% was used to discount cash flows. The following snapshots of data tables
will help illustrate the parameter estimation process for crop production functions.
Table 7: Snapshot of NASS Report for Cotton Production in Tennessee
County District Planted All Purposes Harvested Yield Production
(acres) (acres) (lbs/acre) (bales)
Dyer 10 25,600 24,800 823 42,500
Carroll 20 24,900 24,700 865 44,500
We use the NASS data (Table 7) to calibrate the crop production function f ik1 (L
ik
1 ) ≡
(βik1 − δik1 Lik1 )Lik1 for each commodity crop i ∈ I, in each county k ∈ K. The discrep-
ancy between acres planted and acres harvested include losses due to crop failure and
summer fallow—the soil conservation practice of moisture preservation. Crop failure
typically claims 2–3% of planted acres while the practice of summer fallow has been
8The cash rental rate reflects average returns to agricultural lands. So while we assume the
farmer produces only a single crop, the decision to allocate land toward the next best alternative
can indicate the desire to grow an alternative commodity crop.
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largely replaced by no-tillage and other soil conservation techniques [110]. Therefore,
in this context, δik1 reflects the yield reduction due to the typical occurrence of crop
failure, while βik1 reflects yield in the absence of crop failure. Since commodity crop
production is mature, we set βik1 = 1.01y
ik, where yik is the NASS reported yield
(column 5 of Table 7). In other words, we assume that in the absence of crop failure,
yields would be 1 percent greater than what was reported. We choose δik1 to satisfy
the following equation: yikĽik = (βik1 − δik1 Ľik)Ľik, where Ľik is the land planted to
crop i in county k (column 3). This calibration method ensures that our production
functions provide estimates consistent with the observed data.
To prevent double counting of the total land available due to the practice of double
cropping9 soybeans and wheat, we assume all counties which planted acres to both
soybeans and wheat engaged in double cropping; therefore, this may undercount land
somewhat. Let KDC denote the set of counties which planted acres to both wheat
and soybeans, Lwheat,k1 denote the land planted to wheat in county k (as reported in
NASS), and Lsoy,k1 denote the land planted to soybeans in county k. Then for each
county k ∈ KDC , we assume the amount of land double cropped with soybeans and
wheat, LWSk1 , the land planted to soybeans under traditional practices (i.e. acres that
are not double cropped but planted solely to soybeans), Lsk1 , and the land planted to
9Double cropping is the practice of growing two crops on the same tract of land during a single
growing season. The NASS database provides the total amount of land planted to a crop without
differentiating between double cropping or traditional practices.
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Switchgrass yields in Western Tennessee vary according to the productivity of the
land on which it is grown [83]. To approximate switchgrass production in each county,
we make several assumptions regarding the quality of land used to grow each crop,
then use the experimental results in Table 8 to calibrate the switchgrass production
function: f ik2 (L
ik
2 ) ≡ (βik2 − δik2 Lik2 )Lik2 . We use the superscript ik to indicate that
switchgrass will be grown in county k on land currently used in producing commodity
crop i. The four experimental switchgrass locations, denoted WDLU (moderately well
drained level upland), WDFP (well- to moderately well-drained flood plain), MDSU
(moderate to somewhat poorly drained eroded sloping upland) and PDFP (poorly
drained flood plain), are characteristic of the physiogeographic landscape in West
Tennessee [83].
The WDLU and WDFP locations represented high-yielding environments
suitable for row crop production. . . . The less-well-drained MDSU and
PDFP locations represented intermediate and marginal yield environ-
ments, respectively, . . . The MDSU landscape, in particular, is repre-
sentative of over half the farmland in West Tennessee, and is considered
to be the most likely production environment for switchgrass produced as
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a bioenergy crop in the region [83].
Table 8: Snapshot of Switchgrass Dry Matter Yields Reported in Mooney et al. (2009)
Experiment Location†
wdfp wdlu pdfp mdsu
Mg ha−1
2004
Mean 2.37 2.96 1.59 2.22
SD 1.21 1.12 0.81 0.63
Min. 0.83 0.72 0.25 1.25
Max. 4.73 4.91 2.80 3.54
2005







Mean 15.59 22.87 10.55 17.96
SD 6.07 4.08 4.52 6.83
Min. 1.86 12.52 2.31 5.47
Max. 35.35 32.23 20.88 36.00
†wdfp=well to moderately well drained flood plain,
wdlu=moderately well drained level upland, pdfp=
poorly drained flood plain, and mdsu=moderately
to somewhat poorly drained eroded sloping upland.
We assume the same physiogeographic conditions extend to the entire state and
classify the productivity of the land planted to each crop in each county by the yields
reported in NASS. Specifically, for each commodity crop i we order all counties from
lowest yield (y(1)i ), to greatest (y
(K)
i ). Counties with yields less than or equal to the
median yield (y(
1/2K)
i ) are assumed to have devoted land of productivity (quality)
similar to MDSU toward production of that crop. In other words, counties with the
lowest yields are assumed to have planted their crop on lower quality (less productive)
land. We use y(
3/4K)




i ], as the cutoff between land
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of quality wdfp and wdlu. See Figure 12 for an illustration. According to [83],
the pdfp category is for marginal land characteristic of that which qualifies for the
USDA Conservation Reserve Program. Therefore, we assume none of the commodities
reported in NASS would have been grown on land of that quality. In our sensitivity
analysis we evaluate the impact of this classification method on model results.
MDSU WDFP WDLU 
yi(1) yi(K) yi(!K) yi("K) 
Figure 12: Soil Classification Rule
Since switchgrass stands typically reach maturity by year three [83, 85], we set βik2
for each land productivity category equal to the reported mean in 2006 for that land
type (Table 8). For example, the land used to grow cotton in Dyer county (Table
7) was classified as MDSU based on its relative yield. Therefore, we set βcot,Dyer2 to
17.96 Mg/ha (8.01 tons/acre). Let Kij denote the set of counties k which used land of
quality j ∈ {wdlu,wdfp,mdsu} to grow commodity i. As an estimate of δik2 on land
of productivity j growing crop i, we take the average of the δik1 ∀k ∈ Kij. Continuing






where n(Kcot,mdsu) is the number of counties growing cotton on land classified as
mdsu. We assume the yield reduction rate for switchgrass is on par with that of
the commodity it is displacing, meaning it experiences the same typical rate of crop
102
failure. The implication of this assumption is that switchgrass yields are fully scalable
in our baseline scenario. Later we relax this assumption to consider what happens
when the yields attainable in the field experiments do not scale with larger field sizes.
The switchgrass production cost, per unit land, was derived from the “cost-
minimizing treatment combination” and estimated harvest costs provided in [83].10
Table 9 lists the switchgrass costs (in 2010 dollars) and yields used for our baseline
scenario.
Table 9: Yield and Cost Parameters for Switchgrass Production by Land Type. (1) Fraction
of maturity yield harvestable in year one. (2) Fraction of maturity yield harvestable in year two.
Prematurity year yields were derived from the 2004 and 2005 mean yields reported in [83]
(Table 8).
Site
Establishment Annual Maintenance Yield at Year One(1) Year Two(2)
Cost Cost Maturity Yield Yield
$/acre $/acre tons/acre
wdlu 158 255 10 13% 51%
wdfp 213 203 7 15% 71%
mdsu 158 235 8 12% 50%
To determine expected profit in the absence of a switchgrass contract over the
T -year horizon for each enterprise in each county (Problem (39) in Section 4.3.0.3)
we require expected prices and costs over the period, as well as yield and cost growth
rates. As the year one price for each crop we use the price estimate provided in the
Field Crop Budgets for 2011 [79] (see Table 10 for an example). For each subsequent
year, we use a 3-year lag expectation over the prices received by Tennessee farmers
during the period from 2008 to 2010. Prices were obtained from the USDA Crop
10According to [83], establishment costs were based on the seeding rate, while annual maintenance
costs were based on nitrogen applications. The study reports the cost of each seeding treatment
(five total) and each nitrogen treatment (four total) tested, as well as the cost minimizing seeding
and nitrogen rate combination. Harvest cost estimates were based on the projected dry matter yield
at each site.
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Table 10: Snapshot of 2010 Crop Budget for Cotton Production
cotton, roundup ready flex - conventional tillage, 850 pound yield
estimated returns and expenses per acre, (12/16row equipment))
item description unit quantity price amount
revenue
Cotton(1)(2)(7) Lint lb. 850 $0.69 $586.50
variable expenses























Values 2010 Summary [115]; the lag expectation, pt = 0.5p2010 + 0.3p2009 + 0.2p2008,
was adapted from [94]. Production costs, both fixed and variable, were also obtained
from the crop budgets; we take the average of all cropping practices (e.g. tillage and
no tillage).11 The rental rate for cropland in each county was obtained from Tennessee
Cash Rents, 2010 [111]. All prices and costs were converted to 2010 dollars using the
consumer price index [17]. Yield and cost growth rates were calculated from USDA
Agricultural Projections to 2020 [116]. We assume the total cropland available is that
which was planted to all purposes in 2010 as reported in NASS (column 3 of Table
7); in other words, L = Ľik. Table 11 lists parameter values for commodity crops in
the baseline scenario.
4.3.2 Switchgrass Supply and Cropland Displacement
We develop switchgrass supply curves, under each contract structure, by first deter-
mining the amount of cropland that could be converted to switchgrass production,
then calculating total supply using the switchgrass production functions. Given a
contract price, each farm enterprise (crop-county pair) allocates land in order to
11The NASS database did not distinguish between cropping practices for production in Tennessee
so we averaged the costs under both cropping practices.
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Table 11: Price, Yield and Cost Parameters for Commodity Crops. (1) NASS only contains data
on harvested acres; costs were derived from the field crop budget for Winter Annuals Hay, excluding
planting costs. Year One price reflects the average breakeven price from the budget. (2) A portion
of the wheat grown in Tennessee is double cropped with soybeans [59]. In our analysis we assume all
counties which grew both wheat and soybeans double cropped. Production costs for double cropped
wheat and soy were estimated as one-half of the costs common to both crops plus crop specific costs
(e.g. crop seeds).
Crop Expected Production Year One 3-yr Lag
Yield Cost Price Expectation
Corn (High Yield) 150 bu/acre 375.43 $/acre 4.85 $/bu 4.46 $/bu
Corn (Low Yield) 120 bu/acre 309.41 $/acre 4.85 $/bu 4.46 $/bu
Cotton 850 lbs/acre 502.56 $/acre 0.85 $/lb 0.72 $/lb
Soybeans 40 bu/acre 231.40 $/acre 10.75 $/bu 10.68 $/bu
Wheat 60 bu/acre 283.21 $/acre 6.25 $/bu 5.15 $/bu
Hay(1) 2 tons/acre 66.92 $/acre 101.82 $/ton 81.59 $/ton
Double Cropped:(2)
Wheat 60 bu/acre 240.47 $/acre 6.25 $/bu 5.15 $/bu
Soybeans 30 bu/acre 229.52 $/acre 10.75 $/bu 10.68 $/bu
maximize expected net present value of profits, Equations (37) and (38), subject to
the land constraint L1 + L2 + L3 ≤ L. As in Chapter 2, we determine the minimum
acceptable contract price that must be guaranteed over the T -year period such that
profit while producing switchgrass is at least as great as expected profit over the
T -year period from commodity production and/or the next best alternative E[ΠNCF ],
see Equation (39). Therefore, provided the contract price ω is at least as great as
the minimum acceptable, we estimate the total cropland which could be converted




























































3 ≤ Ľik (41)
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3 ≤ Ľik (42)
Note the land allocation decision is made only once at t = 0. We assume the
contract locks in that land use for the full T periods.12 Realistically, the land allocated
to commodity production, L1, and the next best alternative, L3, will change over the
period as spot price expectations are updated. However, our focus is on the land
converted to switchgrass production, and since we assume that decision is irreversible
over the contract lifespan, we do not simulate changes in L1 and L3 as commodity
prices and cash rental rates change over time. We also assume the contract offer is a
one time, take-it-or-leave-it contract so that the farmer will not be offered a contract
in any other period.



























under wholesale contract and capacity procurement contract, respectively.
12Under capacity procurement the contract indeed makes the land allocation decision binding.
Terms of the wholesale contract only specify payment on whatever is produced. However, since
it takes several years for switchgrass stands to reach maturity it is reasonable to assume that for
short horizons like the one we consider here, land conversion will not be reversed before the contract
period ends.
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4.4 Results and Discussion
4.4.1 Initial Results
Our model assumes a 5 year contract period (T = 5) for switchgrass production. This
length was chosen to be consistent with the production parameters obtained from [83]
and to keep in line with our focus on near-term feasibility. There is still consider-
able uncertainty with respect to biofuel policies and technologies. In the midst of
such uncertainty, a farmer or biorefinery might be reluctant to enter into a contrac-
tual arrangement with longer horizon. Summary results of our baseline scenario are
depicted in Figures 13–15. Converted cropland under each contract structure, at
varying contract prices, is illustrated in Figures 13 and 14. The corresponding supply
of switchgrass, once stands have reached maturity, is illustrated in Figure 15.
In 2010, Tennessee planted 0.71 million acres of corn, 0.38 million acres of cot-
ton,13 1.45 million acres of soybeans, 0.26 million acres of wheat, and harvested 1.95
million acres of hay [114]. A total of 4,529,900 acres (4.5 million acres) were planted
to these five crops throughout the state, compared with 290 million acres devoted to
these crops across the country. Using our method for estimating double cropped acres
outlined in (40), we assume 1.2 million acres were planted to soybeans using tradi-
tional practice, 0.036 million acres of wheat were planted under traditional practice,
and 0.22 million acres were double cropped.14
Under wholesale contract (Figure 13), a farm gate price of $55/ton was sufficient
to convert 14% of total cropland.15 A majority of the land converted at that price
(67%) was land used in harvesting hay. Switchgrass production was least competitive
13According to the 2010 State Agriculture Overview, 390,000 acres of cropland were used in
planting cotton [112]. However, the NASS database only accounts for 384,400 of those acres.
14The expected soybean yield under double cropping is less than under traditional practice by 10
bushels per acre. The expected wheat yields are equivalent. Therefore, overestimating the amount
of land used in double cropping would result in overestimating the total amount of land that would
be converted to switchgrass (by underestimating soybean revenues). Similarly, underestimating the
amount of land used in double cropping tends to underestimate the cropland that would be converted
to switchgrass production.




























Hay! SoyWheat_DC! Wheat! Soybeans! Cotton! Corn!
Figure 13: Fraction of total cropland converted to switchgrass production and the
commodity crops they displace under a wholesale contract as a function of price
for the Tennessee case study. SoyWheat DC refers to double cropping of soybeans
and wheat. Note that wheat planted under traditional practices comprises such a
small share of cropland that it is faintly visible between soybeans and double cropped
soybeans and wheat.
with corn, displacing less than 4% of its cropland at $55/ton and less than 32% at
$70/ton. Switchgrass was most competitive with wheat, displacing more than 66% of
its cropland at $55/ton and all of the land planted exclusively to wheat at $60/ton.
Soybean production is quite profitable relative to wheat, so the displacement of land
that was double cropped occurred at a rate slightly higher than soybean displace-
ment. At $55/ton, 7.3% of the land growing soybeans under traditional practice was
displaced and 12.6% of double cropped acres were displaced.
Under capacity procurement contract (Figure 14), a farm gate price of $350/acre
was sufficient to convert 67% of total cropland. As under the wholesale contract
structure, switchgrass was most competitive with wheat and least competitive with
corn, displacing 100% and 6.97% of cropland, respectively, at $350/acre. Recall that
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Figure 14: Fraction of total cropland converted to switchgrass production and the
commodity crops they displace under a capacity procurement contract at various
prices.
land productivity. Therefore, once stands reach maturity, the capacity procurement
price of $350/acre yields average prices per ton which range from $39 to $54. The
pre-maturity yields are an important factor in determining switchgrass conversion
under wholesale contract. This point will be illustrated further in Section 4.4.2 when
we discuss results from our sensitivity analysis.
Switchgrass supply curves are presented in Figure 15; the figure depicts dry tons
available per year, once stands have reached maturity. The vertical axis on the right
displays the wholesale price and corresponds to the triangle markers, while the axis
to the left displays the capacity procurement prices which correspond to the square
markers. At $55/ton, over six million dry tons of switchgrass are available under
wholesale contract. At a capacity procurement price of $350/acre, over 23 million
dry tons are available. To put this level of supply in perspective, at a conversion rate
of 70 gallons cellulosic ethanol per dry ton, an ethanol biorefinery with a 50 million

























Figure 15: Switchgrass supply curves under capacity procurement and wholesale
contracts for the Tennessee case study.
year; a biorefinery with a 100 mmgy capacity would require roughly 1.4 million dry
tons annually.16
A demonstration scale cellulose-to-ethanol plant in Tennessee was reported to have
a breakeven price for delivered feedstock (maximum willingness to pay for switchgrass
that has been transported to the site) of $83/Mg ($76/ton in 2010 dollars) [83]. The
pilot plant, which will use both switchgrass and corn cobs, has a capacity of 250,000
gallons per year [2]. A farm gate price of $55/ton leaves about $21/ton to cover
transportation and storage costs. Literature estimates of switchgrass transportation
costs range from $14–$36 per ton while storage estimates range from $2–$3 per ton
(2007 dollars) [85].
Currently, the pilot plant has three-year contracts with farmers in surrounding
counties, paying each $450 per acre per year [57]. The price seems high, but the
16These biorefinery capacities are typical of those in existence or under construction in the United
States in 2010. The conversion rate is at the conservative end of rates reported in the literature [85].
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group is conducting a number of experiments with management practices. Some
explanation for the contract terms was provided by Kelly Tiller, president of Genera
Energy, LLC—which has partnered with DuPont Danico Cellulosic Ethanol in this
endeavor.
Those types of experiments, especially those tinkering with yield, were
part of the consideration of how and why Tiller and her colleagues arrived
at the $450/year-for-three-years contract. “Price discovery is really diffi-
cult because it’s just a very immature market—if there’s even a market
for switchgrass,” she says. “We had to find ways to arrive at a price at-
tractive enough for farmers to be willing to participate and take on any
risks. We don’t want the price so high it sends the wrong market signals
or provides any kind of long-term consequence.” Paying only based on
tonnage or other volume amount wasn’t going to make farmers happy or
willing when researchers wanted to experiment on production practices
affecting yield, Tiller says [57].
The estimated breakeven price (biorefinery willingness to pay) and actual contract
price currently being offered provide a benchmark by which we can compare produc-
tion potential across districts.
Switchgrass supply is presented by Agricultural Statistics District (ASD) in Figure
16. Under the wholesale contract structure, Figure 16(a), the majority of switchgrass
available at lower contract prices is supplied by District 60, a district dominated by
hay production. Once prices reach $65/ton most switchgrass available is supplied
by District 20, the largest district in terms of available cropland. In contrast, under
capacity procurement contract the lion’s share of switchgrass supply is available from
District 20 at every price, Figure 16(b). These results are consistent with those
obtained in [54]. These two districts have the potential to supply a substantial amount
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(b) Capacity Procurement Contract
Figure 16: Switchgrass supply curves by district under (a) wholesale contract and (b)
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Corn! Cotton! Soybeans! Wheat! SoyWheat_DC! Hay! Fraction Converted!
(d) District 60: Capacity Procurement Contract
Figure 17: Available supply, fraction of cropland converted to switchgrass production,
and the crops which would be displaced at various contract prices in Districts 20 and
60. Supply under wholesale contract is depicted in Figures (a) and (c) for Districts 20
and 60, respectively. Corresponding capacity procurement contracts are depicted in
Figures (b) and (d). Columns indicate supply (left vertical axis) while square markers
indicate the fraction of total district cropland converted in order to achieve the level
of supply.
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Profit margins on hay production are thin at average yields [1]. A considerable
number of counties in District 60 achieve yields substantially greater than the average;
however, the expected price of hay is low, making the crop vulnerable to displace-
ment.17 On the other hand, soybeans are the dominant crop in District 20, but all
major crops are well represented. While there is substantial production of higher
margin crops, yields in the district are low to moderate. Two-thirds of cropland
is classified as mdsu, the lowest quality category we consider, and one quarter is
classified wdfp, the mid level quality.
In District 20 a wholesale price of $55/ton could secure 700,000 dry tons switch-
grass, enough to supply a 50 mmgy ethanol biorefinery under the moderate conversion
rate of 70 gallons per dry ton, displacing only 6% of total cropland in the district.
At the more optimistic conversion rate of 90 gallons per dry ton, only 600,000 dry
tons switchgrass would be required annually, displacing even fewer crops. In District
60, that wholesale price could secure over 3.1 million dry tons, more than enough to
supply the 1.4 million dry tons a 100 mmgy ethanol biorefinery requires under the
moderate conversion rate, or several 50 mmgy biorefineries depending on the geo-
graphic dispersion of available feedstock. However, siting several biorefineries may
lead to higher contract prices if biorefineries must compete with commodity crop
production and rival facilities.
Figure 18 illustrates the relationship between biomass feedstock adoption and
land quality. Interestingly, contract structure plays an important role in the compet-
itiveness of biomass feedstock production on lands of different productivities. At a
wholesale price of $55/ton, most of the cropland converted is of the highest quality,
wdlu. The majority of this conversion comes from hay in District 60; however, a
17Despite the importance of hay, in terms of the value of Tennessee’s agricultural production, there
is no central market for its sale in the state. Price discovery is largely through word of mouth and
a hay directory website. Compared with other commodity crops, little is known about the supply








































(b) Capacity Procurement Contract
Figure 18: Switchgrass supply curves by land type under (a) wholesale contract and
(b) capacity procurement contract. Supply is based on maturity year yields.
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substantial amount of the highest yielding cropland growing cotton is also converted.
Conversely, at a capacity procurement price of $350/acre only low, mdsu, and mid
quality, wdfp, lands are converted. Roughly equal amounts of mid quality soybean
and hay cropland is converted. All of the low quality cotton cropland is converted, and
nearly all of the low quality cropland planted to soybeans, hay, and double cropped
(soybeans and wheat) are converted.
The amortized cost of producing switchgrass on high quality land (productivity
wdlu) is $246 per acre, or roughly $24 per ton. Amortized costs are $216 per acre
($31/ton) and $229 per acre ($29/ton) on mid (wdfp) and low (mdsu) quality lands,
respectively. The average cash rental rate in the six districts is $70 per acre. Under
capacity procurement contract, $350/acre is not competitive on land of quality wdlu
since, although it has the greatest yield, it also has the highest production cost per
acre. The cost per ton, however, is lower on wdlu land so that a lower wholesale
price is competitive on this quality of land since profit can be recouped via the volume
produced. This suggests that the wholesale contract should be offered to farmers with
more productive land, particularly if the expected price outlook for commodities is
not very optimistic, as is the case for cotton and hay.
Tables 12 and 13 illustrate the price premium that must be offered in order to
induce farmer participation in switchgrass production.18 We compare the farmer’s
breakeven price for switchgrass (the price at which costs are recouped) with the
minimum acceptable contract price, the price such that profit under contract to pro-
duce switchgrass is at least as great as profit without a contract. Keeping with the
literature, breakeven prices are calculated as the sum of amortized establishment,
production and land rent (opportunity) costs. To achieve units of cost per ton to
facilitate comparisons under the wholesale contract structure we use the annualized
18Here we define a “premium” as the difference between the farmer’s minimum acceptable contract
price and the price at which all costs are recouped. It is the farmer’s required markup.
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Table 12: Comparison of breakeven price for feedstock production and minimum contract price
required for wholesale contract acceptance by crop and land quality. (1) Double cropped soybeans
and wheat.
Crop Amortized Amortized Cash Annualized Breakeven Minimum
Costs Rental Rate Yield Price Contract Price
$/acre $/acre ton/acre·yr $/ton $/ton
Corn
wdlu 246 37 – 112 7.18 39 – 50 62 – 72
wdfp 216 37 – 102 5.23 48 – 61 74 – 83
mdsu 230 33 – 134 5.61 47 – 65 48 – 71
Cotton
wdlu 246 100 – 106 7.18 48 – 49 53 – 56
wdfp 216 40 – 110 5.23 49 – 62 60 – 67
mdsu 230 65 – 112 5.61 53 – 61 53 – 61
Soybeans
wdlu 246 37 – 71 7.18 39 – 44 56 – 70
wdfp 216 41 –106 5.23 49 – 62 59 – 70
mdsu 230 37 – 134 5.61 48 – 65 48 – 65
Wheat
mdsu 230 36 – 90 5.61 47 – 57 47 – 57
Double
Crop(1) wdlu 246 47 – 67 7.18 41 – 44 52 – 68
wdfp 216 46 – 106 5.23 50 – 62 61 – 75
mdsu 230 36 – 134 5.61 47 – 65 48 – 84
Hay
wdlu 246 32 – 82 7.18 39 – 46 51 – 54
wdfp 216 34 – 100 5.23 48 – 60 63 – 65
mdsu 230 33 – 134 5.61 47 – 65 56 – 65
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Table 13: Comparison of breakeven price for feedstock production and minimum contract price
required for capacity procurement contract acceptance by crop and land quality. (1) Double cropped
soybeans and wheat.
Crop Amortized Amortized Cash Breakeven Minimum
Costs Rental Rate Price Contract Price
$/acre $/acre $/acre $/acre
Corn
wdlu 246 37 – 112 284– 358 444 – 518
wdfp 216 37 – 102 284 – 318 386 – 432
mdsu 230 33 – 134 262 – 363 268 – 398
Cotton
wdlu 246 100 – 106 346 – 353 382 – 401
wdfp 216 40 – 110 256 – 326 315 – 349
mdsu 230 65 – 112 294 – 341 294 – 341
Soybeans
wdlu 246 37 – 71 284 – 317 405 – 506
wdfp 216 41 –106 257 – 322 307 – 368
mdsu 230 37 – 134 266 – 363 268 – 363
Wheat
mdsu 230 36 – 90 265 – 319 265 – 319
Double
Crop(1) wdlu 246 47 – 67 294 – 313 371 – 490
wdfp 216 46 – 106 262 – 322 321 – 393
mdsu 230 36 – 134 265 – 363 268 – 470
Hay
wdlu 246 32 – 82 278 – 328 368 – 385
wdfp 216 34 – 100 250 – 316 329 – 338
mdsu 230 33 – 134 262 – 363 312 – 363
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switchgrass yield.
In general, price premiums are greatest on the most productive land—cropland of
type wdlu—and for land used to grow soybeans and corn. For land growing corn,
the minimum acceptable contract price is as much as 72% greater than the breakeven
price on wdlu quality land, as much as 59% above breakeven on wdfp quality, and
as much as 46% on mdsu. Similarly, for soybeans, the minimum acceptable contract
price is as much as 78%, 40% and 17% on wdlu, wdfp and mdsu quality land,
respectively.
For some crop-land quality pairs the breakeven price and minimum acceptable
contract price coincide. This is true for counties in which commodity production is
not profitable at expected future prices, due to low yields, so that in the absence of a
contract the land would have been allocated toward the next best alternative, earning
a return equal to the cash rental rate. This is the case for several counties growing
cotton, soybeans and wheat on mdsu quality land.
To summarize the results we find that: 1) switchgrass production in the Tennessee
case study is least competitive with corn and most competitive with wheat and hay;
2) the unit price (price per ton) of achieving a given maturity year switchgrass supply
level is lower under the capacity procurement payment mechanism; 3) lower wholesale
prices can be supported on high quality land due to the lower unit cost from higher
yields, but low capacity procurement prices can only be supported on lower quality
land where production costs are lower; and 4) unless expected future profit from com-
modity production is negative, breakeven pricing will not induce farmer participation
in switchgrass production.
4.4.2 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we evaluate the sensitivity of our results to key model parameters. We























VARIABLE! LOW (7 tons/acre)! MID-LEVEL (8 tons/acre)! HIGH (10 tons/acre)!
Figure 19: Displaced corn under wholesale contract when switchgrass yields do not
vary with land quality. In the low case we assume the maximum switchgrass yield
on all land is 7 tons per acre. The mid-level case assumes a yield of 8 tons per acre
on all land; the high case assumes 10 tons per acre is attainable on all land. The
variable case depicts initial model results.
Recall that we classified the land productivity of each crop-county pair by its
relative 2010 yield. To assess the importance of yield assumptions on supply esti-
mates, and validate our land classification method, we compare corn displacement
under varying land productivity assumptions for the wholesale contract structure,
see Figure 19. From our initial results, in which switchgrass yields vary according to
the productivity of the land on which it is grown, we concluded that switchgrass was
least competitive with corn. We compare these initial competitiveness results with
three different cases, low, mid-level, and high, in which switchgrass yields do not
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vary according to the productivity of the land. But rather, all land, regardless of
productivity classification (soil quality) produce the same expected switchgrass yield.
The variable case denotes our initial results.
In the low case we assume switchgrass yield (βik2 ) and production costs on all
land qualities are 7 tons per acre and $216 per acre, respectively. This coincides
with the yield and production costs on wdfp land. Similarly, yield and production
costs in the mid-level case are, respectively, 8 tons per acre and $230 per acre,
corresponding with the yield and costs on mdsu land. The high case yields 10
tons per acre at a cost of $246 per acre, as with wdlu land. This sensitivity analysis
compares corn displacement when a single switchgrass yield estimate is applied to the
entire state (low, mid-level, or high yield), versus displacement when switchgrass
yield depends on land quality (variable).
Switchgrass competitiveness, hence potential supply, depends on the land quality
classification in two ways: via the anticipated yield and the production cost. Con-
sidering the production cost (establishment, annual maintenance and harvest costs)
to yield ratio, production is cheapest on wdlu land (high scenario) at $34/ton,
and most expensive on wdfp land (low scenario) at $41/ton; production on mdsu
land (mid-level scenario) is also approximately $41/ton. When we include the cash
rental rate (opportunity cost of land), per unit production costs range from $39 to
$50 per ton on wdlu land, $48 to $61 per ton on wdfp land, and $47 to $65 per ton
on mdsu land (see corn breakeven prices in Table 12).19
From Figure 19 it is evident that when yields on all land are high switchgrass is
most competitive with corn production. Since we assume all counties face the same
cost of producing corn (based on the crop budget), regardless of its observed yield,
those counties with low corn yields would find switchgrass production quite profitable
19Under capacity procurement contract, the farmer’s payment is independent of the yield so any
difference between the variable, low, mid-level, and high cases would be a result of the change
in production cost. We consider this later.
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relative to corn production in this scenario. Precisely, at $50/ton the average corn
yield on the acres that converted to switchgrass was 37% lower than the average corn
yield in the counties that did not elect to grow any switchgrass at that price. To
the extent that low crop yields reflect low land productivity, a one-size-fits-all yield
estimate could grossly overestimate potential supply availability if too optimistic.
At $50/ton, $55/ton, and $60/ton, results from the mid-level case are identical
to our initial variable case results. In the variable case, only lands of quality
mdsu (where yields and costs are equivalent to those in the mid-level scenario)
convert to switchgrass production at those prices, hence the equality. At $60/ton,
corn displacement under variable, low and mid-level scenarios are roughly equal.
Of the 19 counties which convert land under the variable case at $60/ton, all planted
corn on land classified as mdsu. In the low case the same 19 counties convert land
for switchgrass production and only one of those counties allocates fewer acres in the
low scenario than it did in the variable case. However, at $55/ton the difference
in breakeven prices has a significant effect on displacement.
At $55/ton the 16 counties which convert cropland under variable conditions
are all of classification mdsu, again, explaining the equivalence between variable
and mid-level results. In the low scenario, only 11 of those 16 counties convert
cropland to switchgrass production. Of those 11, four convert fewer acres than under
variable conditions. The reduction in conversion at $55/ton under the low scenario
is the result of an increase in each county’s minimum acceptable contract price. For
these counties, the difference in switchgrass production cost is not substantial (in both
cases the production cost per ton is approximately $41). However, the difference in
opportunity cost, per ton, is considerable. In the low yield case, the opportunity
cost of land in the 9 counties which converted fewer acres is $0.50 to $1.00 per ton
greater than it is in the variable case where yields in those counties are assigned
a higher value. Thus, counties with higher opportunity costs could not support the
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increase in total costs per ton under the low yield scenario.
This sensitivity analysis illustrates the importance of yield variability to biomass
feedstock adoption. Applying high yield estimates to less productive cropland paints
an overly optimistic view of feedstock competitiveness and, hence, farmer willing-
ness to participate in biomass feedstock production. Similarly, low yield estimates
understate the appeal of feedstock production on more productive land at compet-
itive contract prices (e.g., $65/ton in Figure 19). Thus, with the research showing
such variability in feedstock yield according to land productivity, this more refined
approach to evaluating feedstock competitiveness and potential supply is warranted.
This sensitivity analysis also suggests that improving yields on less productive land,
especially in the years before switchgrass stands reach maturity, will be an important
avenue through which a substantial supply of feedstock can be secured cheaply under
wholesale contract.
Wholesale versus Capacity Procurement Contract and the Yield Profile
The models discussed in Section 4.2 use annualized yields when estimating the
competitiveness of switchgrass and anticipated supply. However, that approach ig-
nores the importance of foregone revenues in early years that are important in the
decision to adopt a perennial crop like switchgrass. The time it takes to establish
the crop (approximately two years in the case of switchgrass) is especially important
when the contract period is relatively short like the five year period we consider here.
To understand the impact of prematurity yields (the fraction of maturity year yields
that can be harvested in years one and two) on supply and crop displacement, we
consider a scenario where the yield in each of the five years has been annualized to the
maturity year yield. In other words, rather than incorporate the actual yield profile





































Corn! Cotton! Soybeans! Wheat! SoyWheat_DC! Hay! Fraction Converted!
Figure 20: Converted cropland and displaced crops under wholesale contract when
the decision to adopt switchgrass is made assuming annualized yields rather than the
actual yield profile in which first and second year yields are only a fraction of maturity
year yields. Columns indicate converted cropland (left vertical axis); square markers
indicate the fraction of total District 20 cropland converted.
later years, we assume a constant yield for each period. Figure 20 illustrates potential
supply in District 20 under this assumption.
Our initial results demonstrate that District 20 has the greatest potential for
switchgrass production, due to its size, but only for prices at or above $65/ton.
Assuming annualized yields, conversion is achieved at substantially lower prices, and
switchgrass production is substantially more competitive with crops like corn even at
such low prices (compare Figures 17(a) and 20).
Under wholesale contract the farmer is only paid per unit produced. So when
yields are low for a substantial portion of the contract period, as in our model, only
the promise of higher prices can induce farmer participation. However, when the
decision to adopt is based on annualized yields, prices as low as $40/ton convert
up to 14% of the district’s cropland, while a price of $45/ton converts 65% of the
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district’s cropland. When using the actual yield profile, Figure 17(a), no cropland is
converted at prices below $50/ton. The assumption of high yields in all years reduces
the minimum acceptable contract price among counties in District 20 between 25%
and 30%. This analysis suggests that for shorter time horizons, using annualized
yields instead of actual yields will overstate the potential supply at any given price.
It also suggests that, assuming comparable yield to cost ratios, wholesale contracts
may be particularly successful at securing cheap biomass when the feedstock is an
annual crop like sorghum. For more on sorghum as a potential dedicated bioenergy
crop, see Rooney, et al. [96].
As a point of comparison, consider potential supply under capacity procurement
contract—which is unaffected by the annualized yield assumption. 74% of District 20
cropland is allocated to switchgrass at $350/acre. For a capacity procurement price
of $350/acre, the average price per ton at maturity is $34, $50, and $44 on wdlu,
wdfp, and mdsu lands, respectively. The overall average price per ton is $45. Thus,
with the annualized yield assumption, performance (land converted and price per ton
switchgrass) under wholesale contract and capacity procurement contract is compa-
rable. Since the annualized yield approach is reasonable over very long horizons, like
those considered in the equilibrium models of Section 4.2, risk preferences would dic-
tate which contract structure is best for long-term contracts. However, for shorter
horizons, where annualized yields are not a reasonable assumption, capacity procure-
ment contracts secure feedstock at a substantially higher cost to the biorefinery on a
per unit basis.
When considering the actual yield profile of switchgrass, the average effective unit
price of a $350/acre capacity procurement price ranges from $265/ton to $353/ton
in year one, based on land productivity20, and between $67/ton and $88/ton in year
two. Even when balanced with maturity year averages, which range from $34/ton
20The average year one yield on mdsu land is less than one ton.
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to $50/ton, the average price per ton when offering a $350/acre capacity procure-
ment price ranges from $87/ton to $115/ton. On the other hand, the wholesale
contract, Figure 17(a), induces 76% of district cropland at $65/ton. Therefore, in-
ducing roughly the same level of conversion—74% at $350/acre, Figure 17(b)—costs
on average 34% to 76% more per ton under capacity procurement contract. Thus, for
shorter contract periods, when an annualized yield is not an appropriate assumption,


















Low (55%)! Medium (75%)! Full!
Figure 21: Displaced hay under wholesale contract assuming low, medium and full
commercial scalability of feedstock production. Under low scalability, the average
yield per acre is 55% of experimental yields at commercial scale production levels.
At medium scalability, average yield per acre is 75% of the experimental yield at
commercial scale production levels.
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Whether experimental yields of cellulosic feedstocks can be sustained at higher
production levels, which we refer to as “commercial scalability,” is an important
concern that very few studies consider. Since commercial scale cellulosic feedstock
production does not yet exist, studies estimating potential supply must rely on the re-
sults of field trials and other simulation experiments, as we do in our model. However,
it is not certain if the results seen will translate at the commercial scale. As noted
previously, the potential for an increase in the severity of pest and disease outbreaks
as the cultivation of cellulosic feedstocks intensifies is an important concern [85].
Our production function lends itself to a study of the consequences of the commer-
cial scalability assumption. Recall (from Section 4.3.1.1) that switchgrass production
is characterized by f2(L2) = (β2 − δ2L2)L2, where β2 represents the maximum yield
per unit area and δ2, the yield reduction rate, is the extent to which the yield per
area decreases as total area increases. The results presented thus far have assumed
full scalability, in line with the scalability of commodity crops. When all available
acres are planted to switchgrass, the average yield per acre is between 98% and 99%
of the maximum yield per unit area. Here we consider the impact of scalability on
the supply and price of switchgrass by comparing our initial results of full commercial
scalability with low and medium scalability assumptions. Under the low scalability
assumption, when all available acres are planted to switchgrass the average yield per
acre is 55% of the maximum; under medium scalability the average yield per acre
is 75% of the maximum. In other words, we choose δ2 for each crop-county pair to
solve:
βik2 − δik2 Ľik = θβik2
where θ = 0.55 in the low scalability scenario and θ = 0.75 in the medium scalability
scenario. Figure 21 illustrates the results on cropland used to harvest hay.
Under wholesale contract, crop displacement is remarkably sensitive to the as-
sumption of full commercial scalability. At $55/ton, hay acreage converted under
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low and medium scalability is only 5.9% and 10.5% of full scalability conversion, re-
spectively. At $70/ton, acreage conversion is only 18.4% and 32.8% of full scalability
conversion for the low and medium cases, respectively. Poor scalability increases the
farm gate price required to secure feedstock and will increase total costs as the requi-
site feedstock supply would have to be obtained in smaller batches from more farms.
This suggests the importance of research which develops best practices for managing
feedstock production at a larger scale.
Expected Spot Price
As expected, the conversion of cropland to switchgrass production is quite sensitive
to the expected commodity price. Figure 22 illustrates switchgrass competitiveness
with hay under varying commodity price expectations. In our initial results, cropland
harvesting hay is converted in substantial quantities. We vary the 3-year lag price to
see how sensitive conversion is to expected future commodity prices.
Under wholesale contract, Figure 22(a), when the future price is expected to be
high ($101 per ton hay) no land is converted at $55 per ton and only 22% of the
cropland harvesting hay could be converted at $60 per ton. This compares with our
initial result of 56% conversion at $60/ton. Similarly, at a wholesale price of $65/ton
switchgrass is competitive on roughly 51% of cropland harvesting hay, compared with
our initial result of 93% conversion. When the price outlook for hay is low ($77 per
ton), $55/ton does not induce much conversion over that suggested by our initial re-
sults since the opportunity cost (cash rental rate) drives competition with switchgrass
production in that instance. At $65/ton all of the hay in the state is displaced when
the price outlook is low. Under capacity procurement contract, Figure 22(b), the
increased value of hay is most pronounced for a contract price of $350/acre. In our




































3-Yr Lag ($82/ton hay)! Low ($77/ton hay)! High ($101/ton hay)!
(b) Capacity Procurement Contract
Figure 22: Displaced hay under (a) wholesale and (b) capacity procurement con-
tracts at various commodity price expectations. The 3-Yr Lag case represents initial
model results; the low case illustrates hay displacement using recent (2009–2010) hay
prices received by Tennessee farmers as the expected outlook; the high case illustrates
displacement using the average price of hay in 2008 as the expected price outlook.
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outlook is particularly optimistic ($101 per ton), that price competes with less than
10% of cropland harvesting hay. In 2008 the average price per ton of hay received
by Tennessee farmers was $101 per ton. In 2009 and 2010 the average price received
was $78/ton and $75/ton, respectively. In the absence of a central market for the
sale of hay, a farmer’s belief about its future value has a very important effect on the




















Initial Cost! 25% Cost Reduction! 15% Cost Increase!
Figure 23: Displaced soybean under capacity procurement contract by annual switch-
grass production cost. The Initial Cost case illustrates our initial model results. The
Cost Reduction case illustrates soybean displacement when annual production costs
are 25% less than the Initial Cost. The Cost Increase case illustrates displacement
when annual production costs are 15% greater than the Initial Cost.
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Figure 23 illustrates switchgrass competitiveness with soybean acres under vary-
ing switchgrass production cost for several cases. Keeping establishment costs the
same as in our initial model run, we investigate the impact of increasing the annual
production and harvest (maintenance) costs by 15%, as well as that of reducing them
by 25%. Nitrogen fertilization, an important factor in annual maintenance costs,
has been the topic of many switchgrass production trials (see [83] and the references
therein). The figure illustrates a 25% reduction in production costs has a big impact
on competitiveness at lower capacity procurement prices. A capacity procurement
price of $250/acre is competitive with nearly 55,000 soybean acres when costs are
reduced. Interestingly, the cost increase is negligible, relative to our initial compet-
itiveness results, except at $350 per acre where conversion potential is 6% of that
determined initially.
4.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we have put forth a method for estimating potential feedstock sup-
ply and its resultant impact on the agricultural landscape that focuses on a farmer’s
land allocation decision between competing endeavors under two different payment
schemes. Our nonlinear approach to the land allocation problem allows us to evaluate
key components in the decision to adopt a new bioenergy crop that linear decision
models cannot address, namely, the importance of commercial scalability in produc-
tion. By incorporating the results of field trials which suggest switchgrass production
is sensitive to soil and land characteristics, we demonstrate the importance of yield
variability on price and potential feedstock availability. Our approach also highlights
the importance of a perennial crop’s yield profile on the decision to adopt when a pay
per ton contract is offered as opposed to a contract which pays per area of land.
While this work contributes to the body of literature on the agricultural impacts
of cellulosic biofuel production, it does have several limitations. Like most other
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studies, our analysis only illustrates switchgrass potential by considering farm gate
prices. The cost of transporting feedstock is a very important factor in this system.
We have not considered transportation costs explicitly because they rely on many
factors that are hard to estimate. However, based on the estimates put forth in the
literature and the demonstration plant’s willingness to pay, switchgrass production
in Tennessee seems viable.
This analysis focused on the competitiveness of switchgrass production on active
cropland. We did not consider lands that have been idled or land used for pasture,
largely in order to maintain the consistency of our data sources, but also because
switchgrass yields are highest on cropland and this type of production is most con-
troversial due to the inherent competition with food crops. Securing an adequate
supply of feedstock for commercial scale cellulosic biofuel production will require the
use of substantial cropland. The analysis presented here shows that Tennessee could
support at least one large biorefinery at a reasonable price without drastically altering
the agricultural landscape, particularly as it relates to food crops. However, this anal-
ysis does not consider any potential feedback effects from the crop displacement. The
livestock sector is important in Tennessee and our model predicts that a substantial
amount of cropland used to harvest hay would be converted to switchgrass produc-
tion. Thus, the impacts of conversion in Tennessee might be felt largely by livestock
producers, especially when drought and other conditions affect pasture lands.
Though this modeling effort is deterministic, we do provide sensitivity analysis
in order to test the robustness of our results to key modeling parameters. Lacking a
reasonable basis from which probability distributions could be developed, a stochastic
model would add little value.
Despite its limitations, this effort makes important contributions with respect to
some of the near-term challenges facing next-generation biofuel production. Though
we focused on switchgrass production in Tennessee, the model can be easily adapted to
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other cellulosic feedstocks in other locations once the appropriate data are obtained.
In providing estimates of the economic potential for switchgrass production at the
county level, model results can be used to make more informed decisions about where
to site biorefineries. And in providing estimates under two payment mechanisms,
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Figure 24: Geospatial map of the value of crops sold in the United States in 2007.
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service.
2007 Census of Agriculture.
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4.6.1 Counties in Tennessee by Value of Crops Sold (2007) and Agricul-
tural Statistics Districts
07-M014
Value of Crops Sold:  2007
1 Dot = $10,000,000















Figure 25: Value of crops sold in Tennessee in 2007. Zoomed in from national map
(Figure 24).
Figure 26: Agricultural Statistics Districts in Tennessee
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(d) Capacity Procurement Contract




Borne out of an interest in the food-versus-fuel debate as it pertains to next-generation
biofuel production, this dissertation uses microeconomic and supply chain coordina-
tion principles to model the interaction between an agricultural producer and biore-
finery who enter into a contractual arrangement for the supply and procurement
of biomass feedstocks. Our model focuses on a farmer’s decision to use productive
cropland for biomass versus commodity (food) crops and how a biorefinery can use
contract terms to influence that decision. In so doing we have provided a frame-
work for understanding the potential effects non-food energy crops can have on food
production through indirect competition for scarce land resources.
Agricultural contracting for production (e.g., crops, livestock) is becoming increas-
ingly prevalent in U.S. agriculture (in 2005, production under contract accounted for
41% of the value of U.S. agricultural production, up from 36% in 2001 and 28% in
1991). And in the developing world where agriculture is often the most important
economic sector, many countries (particularly in Africa) are looking toward contract
farming as a way to encourage production and farmer access to markets. There has
not, however, been much study of the design of agricultural contracts, especially from
a supply chain perspective.
By comparing several contract structures according to their ability to achieve
target participation goals, improve total system performance and distribute profits
between agents, this study provides a framework for evaluating contract design in an
agricultural context, providing useful insights into the factors with the most substan-
tial influence over equilibrium outcomes. In evaluating equilibrium outcomes across
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types of farmers who enter into contracts for very distinct reasons, we have identified
the effects of implicit and explicit competition from non-contracted production on
contract terms and contract acceptance. And with respect to near term feasibility
of next-generation biofuel production we have demonstrated the importance of yield
variability, commercial scalability, and payment structure in estimating the potential
supply of biomass and in assessing the impact of energy crop production on the agri-
cultural landscape via the commodity (food) crops they displace. By assessing the
economic potential of energy crop production at the county level, the results of our
model can be used to make more informed decisions about where to site biorefiner-
ies. And, by analyzing economic potential under two different payment mechanisms,
we have identified key features that will help biorefineries and agricultural producers
arrive at the contract structure most appropriate for their circumstances and needs.
The challenge of securing an adequate supply of feedstock is just one of several
roadblocks impeding large scale production of next-generation biofuels. This challenge
is an important one, however, due to potential ramifications on the food system. Un-
derstanding the impact of energy crop production on agricultural land use is one step
toward identifying potential consequences on the food system. Another important
step—particularly as it relates to establishing an industry for next-generation biofu-
els in the near term—may include modeling and evaluating the economic feasibility
and food system impacts of regionally concentrated bioenergy production.
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